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LET’S TALK ABOUT TAX: FIXING BANK 
INCENTIVES TO SABOTAGE STABILITY 
Hilary J. Allen* 
Regulatory capital requirements are in place to improve bank (and 
systemic) stability by forcing banks to fund themselves with more 
loss-absorbent equity.  But banks have strong incentives to prefer 
debt funding to equity funding, and thus to arbitrage regulatory 
capital requirements.  In particular, banks have (often successfully) 
petitioned regulators to allow them to satisfy regulatory capital 
requirements with hybrid debt-equity instruments that can be treated 
as debt for tax purposes.  Unfortunately, the financial crisis showed 
that the first generation of these hybrid instruments, including trust 
preferred securities, did not live up to their promise of promoting 
bank stability.  The next generation of hybrids, the contingent 
convertible bonds or “cocos,” have the potential to be downright 
harmful to stability. 
We therefore need to address bank incentives to create hybrid 
instruments, and otherwise arbitrage regulatory capital requirements.  
While regulatory capital requirements are almost always discussed in 
isolation from tax policy, this Article recognizes that banks’ 
reluctance to fund themselves with larger cushions of common 
equity is, in large part, a tax problem.  Financial regulators, rather 
than accepting such tax preferences as a given, should engage with 
their tax colleagues and revisit the wisdom of tax policies that 
incentivize reliance on debt funding, and the instability such reliance 
creates.  To that end, this Article takes the first step in fusing 
together regulatory capital scholarship with the tax literature on 
reducing debt bias, and proposes that common equity held by banks 
as regulatory capital should be made tax deductible. 
                                                                                                                 
* Assistant Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.  Many thanks to 
Chris Brummer, Vic Fleischer, Bob Hockett and James Kwak for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts.  Thanks also go to participants in the Brooklyn Law School 
Workshop on Financial Regulation for their input. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many non-tax lawyers, the complexity of tax law makes it a 
subject approached with trepidation and awe: tax is shrouded in a 
mystique that makes non-experts wary of intruding.1  But understanding 
tax law is fundamentally important to the regulation of banks, because 
tax law creates strong incentives for banks to fund themselves with debt 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Commenting on the complexity of tax law, LoPucki noted that “the tradeoff for 
that complexity is that the expert community is fully absorbed with it and has less time 
to devote to understanding how the law they have mastered relates to the rest of the 
world.  Additionally, legal expertise that goes beyond a certain level of complexity is of 
little use, because it cannot be communicated to others, which ordinarily is a 
prerequisite to application.” Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the 
Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1542 (1996). 
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rather than equity, 2  and banks with insufficient equity funding are 
inherently unstable due to their limited ability to absorb losses.3  It is 
therefore vital that financial regulatory scholars and policymakers 
engage with tax law to address these tax-driven incentives for 
instability.  Unfortunately, perhaps because of the perception of tax law 
as a segregated and impenetrable discipline,4 this has rarely happened.5  
The key contribution of this Article, then, is to recognize the 
interdependent nature of regulatory capital and taxation policies, and 
spur a conversation between the disciplines.6 
In particular, this Article seeks to push the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (the preeminent international standard setter for 
bank regulation)7 to consider tax issues.  To date, the BCBS has not 
directly confronted the tax-driven bias towards debt financing.8  Instead, 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Ilan Benshalom, How to Live With A Tax Code With Which You Disagree: 
Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 1217, 1221 (2010). 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. Gilson and Schizer comment that “tax ‘practice’ [is] the plumbing of tax law 
that is familiar to practitioners but, predictably, is opaque to those, including financial 
economists, outside the day-to-day tax practice.” Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, 
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred 
Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 877 (2003). 
 5. Viral Acharya and his colleagues have commented that “[t]he fact that neither 
the Dodd-Frank Act nor Basel III tries to investigate the question of why equity 
financing is more costly than debt financing is rather disappointing.” Viral V. Acharya, 
Nirupama Kulkarni & Matthew Richardson, Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity 
Requirements, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW 
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 143, 157 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011). 
 6. Although accounting issues are not covered in any detail in this Article, 
accountants also have an important role to play in this conversation. 
 7. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or “BCBS” is an international 
standard-setting body comprised of representatives from twenty-seven different 
countries. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (last visited June 15, 2013).  Because 
the IMF and the World Bank often require countries to comply with the BCBS’s 
standards as a condition of receiving assistance (and still more countries have chosen to 
comply with the BCBS’s standards as best practices, or to provide comfort to foreign 
investors), standards promulgated by the BCBS apply to many more countries than its 
twenty-seven members. See KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE, & JOHN EATWELL, 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
SYSTEMIC RISK 39 (2006).  This raises legitimacy issues, which are discussed in more 
detail in notes 356–58, infra, and accompanying text. 
 8. The underlying tax incentives for higher bank leverage are not even mentioned 
in Basel I, II or III.  Basel I goes so far as to say that “tax considerations are not 
824 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
it seems content to view this bias as inevitable and has created a “work-
around” by implementing rules that require a minimum percentage of 
bank funding to be comprised of equity and equity-like instruments 
rather than debt 9 —these rules are known as regulatory capital 
requirements.10  We are thus left with something of a policy paradox: 
financial regulation forces banks to fund themselves with more equity, 
while tax rules simultaneously punish equity funding.11 
                                                                                                                 
addressed in this paper.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL 
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 3 (1988), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf [hereinafter BASEL I]. 
 9. Shackelford et al. have noted that, traditionally, “academics and policymakers 
have given far less attention to the possible role of tax instruments in the financial . . . 
realm, reflecting direct regulation’s predominant role in addressing financial sector 
issues.” Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel N. Shaviro, & Joel Slemrod, Taxation and the 
Financial Sector, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 781, 782 (2010). 
 10. The BCBS has promulgated three major standards that are colloquially known 
as Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III.  Formally speaking, Basel I is a document titled 
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards,” that was 
published by the BCBS in July of 1988.  Basel I (like the subsequent Basel II and III 
standards) was not binding on individual nations, but each of the then G-10 nations 
committed to implement Basel I into national law by the end of 1992. See BASEL I, 
supra note 8, at 14.  As Basel I became outmoded, the BCBS issued new standards. See 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf [hereinafter BASEL II]. This is 
colloquially known as Basel II, and it was intended to be phased in from 2006 through 
2009.  However, even before the implementation was complete, the Financial Crisis 
showed the regulatory capital requirements of Basel I and II to be inadequate.  The 
BCBS responded with a compilation of documents that have come to be known as 
Basel III.  The key document setting out regulatory capital requirements under Basel III 
was released on December 16, 2010 and is entitled “Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT 
BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ 
/bcbs189.pdf [hereinafter BASEL III]. 
 11. The paradoxical nature of policy with respect to regulatory capital was 
highlighted in a comment letter written to the Financial Times by twenty prominent 
economists.  They noted that “[i]t is paradoxical to subsidize debt that generates 
systemic risk and then regulate to try to limit debt.” Anat Admati et al., Healthy 
Banking System Is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, 
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/packages/pdf/admatiFTletter11.09.10.pdf. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also noted that “[b]anks face both an explicit 
tax advantage of debt and, through regulatory requirements, an implicit penalty— with 
evident risk of policy incoherence.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, DEBT BIAS AND OTHER 
2013] BANK INCENTIVES AND TAXATION 825 
In what appears to be a subconscious attempt to reconcile these 
inconsistent tax and financial regulatory positions, the BCBS has 
expended considerable effort to allow banks to satisfy at least some of 
their regulatory capital requirements with hybrid debt-equity 
instruments. 12   These hybrids have some of the loss-absorbing 
characteristics of equity, but also possess a sufficient number of debt-
like attributes to justify their being treated as debt instruments for the 
purposes of tax-deductibility.13  However, by allowing hybrids to count 
as regulatory capital, the BCBS is promoting the creation of new and 
complex financial instruments that can compromise bank and financial 
system stability.14  Furthermore, the allocation of resources to devising 
these hybrid instruments can be viewed as socially wasteful, because the 
instruments have little use other than to arbitrage regulatory capital 
requirements.15 
A simpler solution is preferable:16 this Article takes the position 
that tax penalties for equity funding are not immutable, and that by 
addressing these tax penalties directly, we can obviate much of the 
desire of banks to satisfy their regulatory capital requirements with 
inferior and complicated hybrid instruments.  To provide some 
background for this discussion, Part I of this Article will briefly 
summarize the regulatory capital standards (known colloquially as Basel 
I, Basel II and Basel III)17 that the BCBS has promulgated over the years 
                                                                                                                 
DISTORTIONS: CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES IN TAX POLICY 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf. 
 12. See infra Part I.A.  
 13. See Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 168. 
 14. See Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Debt and Equity: Joint Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means & the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 9 
(2011) (statement of Victor Fleischer, Professor, University of Colorado Law School) 
[hereinafter Fleischer], available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Fleischer%20Testimony.pdf; Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability 
Regulation 37–39 (Feb. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2085336. 
 15. See Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1233–34; see also Fleischer, supra note 14, at 
20. 
 16. “In complex environments, decision rules based on one, or a few, good reasons 
can trump sophisticated alternatives. Less may be more.” Andrew G. Haldane, 
Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, & Vasileios Madouros, 
Economist, Bank of England, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
Symposium: The Changing Policy Landscape, The Dog and the Frisbee 5 (Aug. 31, 
2012), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf?frames=0. 
 17. See supra notes 8, 10. 
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in an attempt to require banks to fund themselves with more equity.  Part 
I goes on to consider in detail the reasons why banks seek to arbitrage 
these regulatory capital requirements, concluding that minimal equity 
funding becomes privately optimal for individual banks (although it is 
suboptimal for society at large) because of tax and other government 
subsidies that favor debt.18 
Using debt-equity hybrid instruments to satisfy regulatory capital 
requirements is one way in which banks can maximize their debt 
funding.  Basel I and II sanctioned this practice,19 but the experience of 
the financial crisis20 showed that many of these hybrid instruments did 
not absorb losses as well as expected,21 and were thus inferior substitutes 
for regulatory capital in the form of common shares and retained 
earnings—the best form of capital, which the BCBS calls “Common 
Equity Tier 1.” 22   To illustrate the problems associated with earlier 
versions of hybrid instruments, Part II.A will consider the case study of 
trust-preferred securities (“TruPSs”), which were very popular in the 
United States until the financial crisis revealed their inadequacies as 
regulatory capital.  While instruments like TruPSs no longer qualify as 
regulatory capital under the most recent Basel III standards,23 Basel III 
does allow banks to use a “next-generation” of hybrid instruments to 
satisfy some of their regulatory capital requirements, so long as these 
hybrids satisfy certain loss-absorbency criteria.24  Part II.B considers the 
most prominent of these next-generation hybrids: the contingent 
convertible capital instrument, or “coco.” 
Although there have been few issuances of cocos to date, these 
hybrid instruments have been feted for their purported recapitalization 
and governance benefits.  However, a detailed examination of these 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion 
of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive 4, 39 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. 
Governance at Stanford Univ., Paper No. 86, 2011), available at 
https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2065R1&86.pdf. 
 19. See infra Part I.A.  
 20. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 will be referred to in this Article as the 
“Financial Crisis.” 
 21. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel Committee Issues Final 
Elements of the Reforms to Raise the Quality of Regulatory Capital (Jan. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.pdf. 
 22. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 13. 
 23. This is because TruPSs cannot be written off or converted into common equity, 
as required. See Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 21. 
 24. Id. 
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cocos indicates that such benefits are limited at best, and are far 
outweighed by the systemic risks involved.25   It therefore comes as 
somewhat of a relief that regulators in the United States have recently 
declined to endorse the use of these instruments as regulatory capital.26  
However, cocos have received a lot of support from authorities in 
Europe, 27  and there was strong international demand for a recent 
issuance of cocos by the British bank Barclays.28   Given the global 
nature of the financial system, if cocos were to destabilize banks in 
Europe, the impact would certainly be felt around the world.29  To avoid 
this outcome, this Article argues that the BCBS should refine its 
international regulatory capital standards to reject cocos and mandate 
that regulatory capital requirements be satisfied entirely with vanilla, 
uncomplicated, Common Equity Tier 1 funding. 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See infra Part II.B.  
 26. A recent study by the Financial Stability Oversight Council recommended “that 
contingent capital instruments remain an area for continued private sector innovation, 
and encourag[ed] the Federal Reserve and other financial regulators to continue to 
study the advantages and disadvantages of including contingent capital and bail-in 
instruments in their regulatory capital frameworks,” but did not recommend 
incorporating cocos into the United States regulatory system at present. FIN. STABILITY 
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STUDY OF A CONTINGENT CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN NON-BANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES AND BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES 3 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents 
/Co%20co%20study[2].pdf.  For a discussion of how regulatory endorsement can lead 
to explosive growth in the market for hybrid instruments, see notes 137–38 and 
accompanying text. 
 27. The Swiss, British and German authorities, as well as the European Union, all 
broadly support the use of cocos. Wulf A. Kaal & Christoph K. Henkel, Contingent 
Capital with Sequential Triggers, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 243, 245–46 (2012). 
 28. The strongest demand for Barclays’ cocos was from Asian investors, but U.S. 
investors were also interested. Helene Durand, Barclays’ Contingent Capital Bond 
Finds Strong Support, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
11/14/barclays-cocos-idUSL5E8ME2YP20121114.  The cocos offered by Barclays 
pose more risk to investors than the cocos discussed in this Article, because they are 
written off upon the occurrence of the trigger event, rather than converting to equity.  
The prospect of having their investment completely wiped out upon the occurrence of 
the trigger event could make investors even more prone to panic, exacerbating the 
concerns raised in Part II.B. of this Article. 
 29. Financial crises can be transmitted around the world by way of the 
“interconnectedness of systemic institutions through an array of complex transactions,” 
as well as “a severe contraction in global liquidity, cross-border credit availability and 
demand for exports.” BASEL III, supra note 10, at 1, 2. 
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Banks will resist this, however, because they prefer hybrids as a 
cheaper alternative to Common Equity Tier 1 funding.30  As established 
in Part I, much of the relative price advantage of debt derives from 
skewed governmental policies and incentives, particularly from 
structural biases in national tax codes that favor debt over equity.31  Part 
III will examine the broad tax literature on reducing corporate bias 
towards debt generally, and consider how this literature can be narrowly 
applied so as to minimize bank antipathy towards holding Common 
Equity Tier 1 regulatory capital.  From this preliminary survey of the tax 
literature, there seems to be a relatively simple and fairly promising way 
of incentivizing banks to fund themselves with more of this type of 
capital: the implementation of an “allowance for Common Equity Tier 
1” or “ACET1,” which would allow banks to fully deduct the cost of 
Common Equity Tier 1 used to satisfy regulatory capital requirements.32 
This Article’s recommendation is therefore two-fold: first, the 
BCBS should require that all regulatory capital requirements be satisfied 
with Common Equity Tier 1 (i.e., the BCBS should no longer recognize 
hybrids as regulatory capital).  Second, individual countries should be 
encouraged to adopt an ACET1 that is based on an optional model 
promulgated by the BCBS.  Part IV therefore gives some thought as to 
how such an ACET1 might be implemented in practice: further input 
from economists and tax scholars will certainly be necessary in 
developing an ACETI, but it is important to note from the outset that 
because this ACET1 would be viewed as a benefit by banks, its 
implementation could avoid some of the political barriers and 
international coordination problems that hamper most financial 
regulatory reforms.33 
I. REGULATORY CAPITAL 
A. CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
Most developed countries have implemented ex ante minimum 
regulatory capital requirements, which are reasonably consistent 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11 (2011). 
 31. See infra notes 263–65 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra Part IV.  
2013] BANK INCENTIVES AND TAXATION 829 
throughout the world because they are based on international standards 
promulgated by the BCBS.34  These standards require banks to maintain 
a minimum ratio of “regulatory capital” (the numerator of the equation) 
to “risk-weighted assets” (the denominator of the equation). Under the 
first iteration of the BCBS’ standards, colloquially known as “Basel I,” 
banks were required to fund themselves with instruments that qualified 
as “regulatory capital” in an amount equal to at least 8.0%35 of their 
“risk-weighted assets.”36  At least 50% of the required regulatory capital 
had to be comprised of instruments that satisfied the criteria for “core” 
capital—these instruments included common equity shares, as well as 
non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (and even some innovative 
hybrid capital instruments with step-up clauses).37  The remaining 50% 
of the required regulatory capital could then be comprised of other types 
of instruments (including hybrid instruments) 38  known as 
“supplementary capital.”39 
The requirements relating to the numerator of the capital ratio 
remained largely unchanged under the second iteration of the BCBS’ 
standards, known as “Basel II,” 40  but Basel II did make significant 
changes to how assets were risk-weighted (the denominator of the 
ratio). 41   Under Basel I, the risk-weighting of a bank asset was 
determined based on which of four “buckets” that type of asset was 
assigned to: for example, all U.S. municipal bonds were accorded a 20% 
risk-weight and all unsecured loans were accorded a 100% risk-weight.42  
But these “buckets” were critiqued as arbitrary and not reflecting the 
true risk posed by an asset (in particular, these “buckets” did not reflect 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 7. 
 35. BASEL I, supra note 8, at 13. 
 36. “Determining a bank’s risk-weighted assets is a complicated calculation that 
reflects the perceived riskiness of assets held by the bank and the perceived likelihood 
that a bank’s contingent obligations will crystallize into actual obligations.” Hilary J. 
Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 125, 131 n.23 
(2012). 
 37. BASEL I, supra note 8, at 3, 6, 13. 
 38. For a discussion of the hybrid instruments that qualified as regulatory capital 
under Basel I, see note 124 and accompanying text.  
 39. See BASEL I, supra note 8, at 4–6. 
 40. See BASEL II, supra note 10, at 12. 
 41. DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 64 (Eric Helleiner & Jonathan Kirshner eds., 
2007). 
 42. Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global 
Convergence in Banking Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 433, 452 (2001). 
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the credit risk of the obligor, such that, for example, all unsecured 
borrowers were treated as equally risky).43  Basel II therefore allowed 
asset risk-weightings to be determined “either by external ratings 
provided by external credit rating agencies (CRAs) or by internal ratings 
calculated by banks, based on their own internal models.”44 
The financial crisis highlighted many flaws in the capital standards 
set out in Basel I and II.  In particular, there was recognition that “[t]he 
global banking system entered the crisis with an insufficient level of 
high quality capital”45; that is, there were problems with the numerator 
of the regulatory capital ratio.  Many of the instruments that were being 
used as regulatory capital (including many hybrid instruments) were not 
able to absorb losses as well as common shares and retained earnings.46  
Thus, the most recent standards developed by the BCBS (known as 
“Basel III”) have a renewed focus on common equity funding.47  Basel 
III requires banks to fund at least 4.5% of their risk-weighted assets with 
Common Equity Tier 1.48  In practice, however, banks must fund at least 
7.0% of their risk-weighted assets with Common Equity Tier 1, or else 
face restrictions on their ability to pay dividends and bonuses.49  In 
addition, the BCBS has promulgated additional capital requirements for 
global systemically important banks,50 and these requirements will also 
need to be met with Common Equity Tier 1.51  However, even though 
the BCBS acknowledges that other types of regulatory capital are 
inferior to Common Equity Tier 1, 52  it does not mandate that all 
regulatory capital requirements must be satisfied with Common Equity 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 453. 
 44. Vanessa Le Leslé & Sofiya Yurievna Avramova, Revisiting Risk-Weighted 
Assets 37 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/90, 2012). 
 45. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 12. 
 46. See id. at 2. 
 47. Id. at 12. The phased implementation of Basel III commenced on January 1, 
2013. Id. at 27.   
 48. Id. at 12.  
 49. This requirement for 2.5% extra Tier 1 common equity is referred to as the 
“Capital Conservation Buffer.” Id. at 55. 
 50. This extra capital requirement will range between 1% and 2.5% of the risk-
weighted assets of the bank, depending on its systemic importance. BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 20 (2011), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.htm. 
 51. Id. 
 52. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 12. 
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Tier 1.  Instead, while Basel III requires banks to maintain total 
regulatory capital in an amount no less than 8% of a bank’s risk-
weighted assets,53 it provides that 1.5% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets 
can be held as “Additional Tier 1” instruments (such as perpetual non-
cumulative preference shares) and 2.0% can be held as “Tier 2” 
instruments (including some types of subordinated debt).54  While it is 
open to banks to satisfy all of their Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
requirements with Common Equity Tier 1,55 banks are unlikely to do so 
because of the expense they associate with such funding.56 
Although Basel III focused most closely on the numerator of the 
regulatory capital ratio, there was also an acknowledgment of some of 
the failings of the denominator (i.e., the measurement of risk-weighted 
assets), and so Basel III introduced a new, non-risk-based leverage ratio 
to “introduce additional safeguards against model risk and measurement 
error by supplementing the risk-based measure with a simple, 
transparent, independent measure of risk.”57  While the BCBS has yet to 
finalize the parameters of the leverage ratio, broadly speaking, it will 
require banks to hold regulatory capital (either Common Equity Tier 1 
common equity or Additional Tier 1 instruments) in an amount equal to 
at least 3% of all assets, including off-balance sheet items.58  But this 
new leverage ratio acts as a backstop to, rather than replacing, the risk-
weighted capital ratio.59  This is a conscious policy choice by the BCBS: 
while the purpose of regulatory capital requirements is to reduce 
leverage by forcing banks to fund more of their activities with equity 
and equity substitutes,60  the BCBS recognizes that not all assets are 
equally risky 61  and believes that risk-weighting assets incentivizes 
stronger risk-management practices by banks;62 these incentives would 
be absent if the BCBS relied primarily on the more simplistic 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id.  This 8% does not include the capital conservation buffer or capital 
surcharges for global systemically important banks.  Factoring in these amounts, 
regulatory capital requirements could be as high as 13% of risk-weighted assets for the 
largest international banks. 
 54. See id. 
 55. It is also open to banks to satisfy their Tier 2 capital requirements with 
Additional Tier 1 capital. 
 56. See notes 91–105 and accompanying text. 
 57. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 4. 
 58. Id. at 61–63. 
 59. Id. at 61. 
 60. See Admati et al., supra note 18, at 8–9. 
 61. Le Leslé & Avramova, supra note 44, at 28. 
 62. BASEL II, supra note 10, at 2. 
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unweighted leverage ratio.  The ratio of regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets thus remains the cornerstone of prudential banking 
regulation, but there are a number of ways that a bank can understate its 
risk-weighted assets to game the ratio and thus fund itself with less 
regulatory capital and more debt.63  A bank can use internal models that 
underestimate the risk of the bank’s assets,64 or it can use accounting 
gimmicks like the “Repo 105” maneuver that was used by Lehman 
Brothers to transfer assets off balance sheet whenever it was required to 
report on its financial condition.65  Because the reforms of Basel III 
made little change to how assets are risk-weighted, the BCBS’s 
standards still afford many opportunities for arbitraging the denominator 
of the regulatory capital ratio. 
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that, even after the reforms 
of Basel III, regulatory capital requirements are still flawed. 66  
Nonetheless, regulatory capital requirements remain the centerpiece of 
international efforts to improve financial stability. 67   This Article 
therefore considers how to maximize the efficacy of such requirements 
by undercutting incentives to arbitrage both the numerator and the 
denominator of the regulatory capital equation (focusing in particular on 
bank incentives to arbitrage the numerator by creating unnecessarily 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, Why and How to Design a 
Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement 4–5 (Working Paper No. 11-41, 2012), 
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-41.pdf. 
 64. Le Leslé & Avramova, supra note 44, at 7. 
 65. The report issued by Anton Valukas (the Examiner in the Lehman Brothers 
Holdings bankruptcy) concluded that:  
Lehman employed off balance sheet devices, known within Lehman as ‘Repo 105’ 
and ‘Repo 108’ transactions, to temporarily remove securities inventory from its 
balance sheet, usually for a period of seven to ten days, and to create a materially 
misleading picture of the firm’s financial condition in late 2007 and 2008. . . .  
Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days prior to 
reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage and balance sheet.  
Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 732–33, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 
445 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-13555 (JMP)), available at 
http://jenner.com/lehman/VOLUME%203.pdf. 
 66. A number of other criticisms have also been leveled at Basel III, including that 
it encourages correlation of bank assets to the detriment of systemic stability. See infra 
Part IV.A.  
 67. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 1 (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications 
/r_120619a.pdf; see also Le Leslé & Avramova, supra note 44, at 4. 
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complex and problematic hybrid debt-equity instruments).  Part I.B will 
delve more deeply into these incentives of arbitrage regulatory capital 
requirements. 
B. INCENTIVES TO ARBITRAGE REGULATORY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
At their heart, regulatory capital requirements are an attempt to 
require banks to fund themselves with less debt.  To deliberately over-
simplify (thus ignoring hybrid instruments for the moment), banks have 
a choice between two types of funding sources: debt or equity.68  The 
proportion of equity funding (as opposed to debt funding) used by banks 
to make loans and acquire other assets is referred to as leverage—the 
less equity funding used, the higher the debt funding and thus the 
leverage. 69   Other things being equal, banks prefer to rely on debt 
funding (and thus to increase leverage) to enable them to acquire more 
assets and multiply their profits in good times.70  However, in bad times, 
the amount of debt incurred by the bank to finance its assets will remain 
constant even as the value of those assets decreases.71  Instead, a fall in 
asset values will reduce (or even wipe out) the value of the equity 
funding such assets; because leverage is the ratio of equity funding to 
the total value of the asset, leverage will increase as equity is reduced.72  
It is easiest to demonstrate this by way of a few simplified mathematical 
examples. 
 
Scenario 1: 
Assume that an asset, A, is purchased by a bank for $100.  The 
bank used $20 of its own equity and $80 of borrowed money, to fund 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Debt can take the form of a loan or a debt security (such as a bond), and 
represents a reasonably fixed liability of the debtor.  Equity (such as a common share) 
is an ownership interest in the issuer of the equity, and the holder of that equity is not 
entitled to any fixed return. See RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING 
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 130 (4th ed. 2008). 
 69. Andrew W. Lo & Thomas J. Brennan, Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on 
Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses? An Analytical Framework, 90 TEX L. REV. 
1775, 1780 (2012).  For a simplified calculation of leverage, divide the total asset value 
by the amount of equity funding for that asset. TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE 4–5 
(2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr328.pdf. 
 70. Lo & Brennan, supra note 69, at 1777. 
 71. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 
2007-2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 92 (2009). 
 72. See ADRIAN & SHIN, supra note 69, at 9. 
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the purchase.  Leverage is 5% (i.e., 100/20).  Assume, then, that the 
value of asset A falls to $95.  The bank’s $80 debt remains constant, 
meaning that the value of the bank’s equity in asset A falls to $15, and 
leverage will be 6 1/3% (i.e., 95/15). 
 
Scenario 2: 
Assume that an asset, A, is purchased by a bank for $100.  The 
bank used $10 of its own equity and $90 of borrowed money to fund the 
purchase.  Leverage is 10% (i.e., 100/10).  Assume, then, that the value 
of asset A falls to $95.  The bank’s $90 debt remains constant, meaning 
that the value of the bank’s equity in asset A falls to $5 and leverage 
will be 19% (i.e., 95/5). 
We can see from these hypotheticals that equity is more loss-
absorbent than debt, because the equity funding used to finance an asset 
will simply become eroded as the asset’s value declines, whereas debt 
obligations remain constant.73  We can also see that the more highly-
leveraged a bank is to begin with, the more its leverage will be affected 
by a reduction in asset values.74 
Once asset values start declining and leverage starts rising, banks 
may face regulatory and/or market pressure to readjust their leverage.75  
At this point, a bank has two options: it can either start selling its assets, 
or raise new equity capital by issuing or selling shares.  If the bank is 
suffering from any type of distress, it will find it difficult to raise new 
common equity capital because of what is known as the “debt overhang” 
problem: new investment is discouraged because investors fear that any 
                                                                                                                 
 73. A report on banking by the United Kingdom’s Independent Commission on 
Banking (known as the “Vickers Report”) discusses in detail why equity is more loss-
absorbent:  
Because the value of a bank’s equity equals the value of its assets less the value of its 
(non-equity) liabilities if asset values fall, equity absorbs losses smoothly.  Equity 
holders know that it is risky.  Further, equity is perpetual.  A bank does not have to re-
finance its equity funding periodically, as it does its debt funding (although it may 
need to add to it from time to time).  So equity cannot ‘run’ in the way that other 
liabilities – in particular, deposits and short-term funding – can.  
INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS 86 (2011). 
 74. It is worth noting that “investment banks . . . were operating at leverage ratios 
of 25:1 to 35:1 in terms of debt to equity before many of them collapsed [in the 
financial crisis].  With such leverage, even a small quantity of abrupt and adverse 
negative news about assets will be sufficient to wipe out equity capital . . . .” Acharya et 
al., supra note 5, at 167. 
 75. ADRIAN & SHIN, supra note 69, at 28. 
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new capital they contribute will be immediately applied to the bank’s 
existing obligations to senior debtholders, wiping out their new 
investment.76  Recapitalization can also be impeded by Akerlof’s famous 
“lemons” problem: 77  in a volatile market, potential buyers of bank 
shares are likely to assume that capital raising must be necessary due to 
problems at the bank.  Because of the imperfect information available to 
them, these potential buyers will discount the amount that they are 
willing to pay for the shares, thus reducing the amount of new equity 
funding that a bank can raise by way of issuing or selling shares.78 
Given the impediments to recapitalization posed by the “debt 
overhang” and “lemons” problems, banks may be left with only one way 
to reduce leverage—selling assets.  Unfortunately, in circumstances 
where there is low liquidity in the market (such as during a crisis when 
numerous parties are trying to reduce leverage by way of asset sales), it 
will be difficult to find a purchaser for the assets, and sales will be made 
at a discount.79  This will drive down the price of equivalent assets,80 and 
if a large number of banks (and other financial institutions) are trying to 
sell the same assets at the same time, these discounts can be quite 
large.81  Falling asset prices will increase the leverage of other banks, 
and those other banks will then face pressure to deleverage by selling 
assets, creating a vicious cycle.82 
Therefore, when highly-leveraged banks deleverage, they often 
generate negative externalities for other market participants by 
depressing asset prices market-wide. 83   Conversely, because equity 
absorbs losses more smoothly than debt, banks with larger Common 
Equity Tier 1 holdings (and thus lower leverage) are less likely to need 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 6. 
 77. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 QUEENS J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). 
 78. Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 
349 (2011). 
 79. Brunnermeier, supra note 71, at 92. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Brunnermeier refers to this as the “fire sale externality.” Id. at 94. 
 83. Whitehead describes the effects of these externalities as follows: “As different 
managers experience similar effects, they are likely to react in the same way by each 
selling assets, causing greater price volatility and prompting further sales. The result is 
a cascading decline in value, with greater coordination impairing each firm’s ability to 
manage its own risk exposure.” Whitehead, supra note 78, at 326–27. 
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to sell assets or raise new capital in the first place.84  If deleveraging 
does become necessary for these banks, they may be able to do so by 
way of raising new equity capital, avoiding asset sales and the negative 
externalities associated with such sales.  This is because larger holdings 
of Common Equity Tier 1 make the “debt overhang” problem less of an 
issue: holders of this type of equity are the most junior claimants in any 
bankruptcy and their claim is only residual (i.e., they have no hard claim 
to any assets of the bank), so they will not take priority over any new 
investment.85  To the extent that a bank is funded with more Common 
Equity Tier 1 vis-à-vis debt, new investors have less reason to fear that 
their capital investment will be wiped out by more senior debt-holders.  
Furthermore, where a bank is already funded with a substantial amount 
of Common Equity Tier 1, the financial situation of the bank is more 
simple and transparent,86 and this may work to reduce the information 
asymmetries that cause the “lemons” problem, increasing the amount 
potential buyers are willing to pay for bank shares.87 
A bank that funds itself with larger cushions of Common Equity 
Tier 1 will therefore be both better able to recapitalize and better able to 
absorb any losses that it suffers.  This is likely to inspire market 
confidence.88  With market confidence, such banks are less likely to 
suffer from the types of liquidity runs that brought down institutions like 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Admati and her colleagues note that “[t]he destabilizing effects of simultaneous 
deleveraging by asset sales would be greatly reduced if banks were much better 
capitalized, because the required level of sales is much reduced when the initial 
leverage is much lower.” Anat Admati et al., Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation 31 
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 114, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031204. 
 85. See Admati et al., supra note 18, at 10. 
 86. In contrast, it is more difficult for banks to reveal the true value of their more 
risky assets. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 9. 
 87. With better information about the issuer available to potential investors, 
investors have less reason to fear a hidden problem at the bank, and so they will charge 
less for their investment (issuers will also need to expend less on disclosure to bridge 
any informational asymmetry).  Furthermore, a less leveraged bank is less susceptible 
to changes in asset values, and as such, there will be fewer instances where drastic 
recapitalization is required.  The expense of new equity issuances can be avoided; 
instead, equity cushions can be slowly repleted with retained earnings. See Admati et 
al., supra note 18, at 37. 
 88. Admati et al. note that “[w]ith greater capital cushions, there would be less risk 
of such systemic breakdowns from mutual distrust.” Id. at 8. 
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Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers,89 and society as a whole is less 
likely to suffer from the negative externalities associated with the failure 
of financial institutions.90  Society thus has a vested interest in banks 
funding themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1, hence the 
implementation of regulatory capital requirements.  Banks, however, are 
more focused on their internal cost of capital and view Common Equity 
Tier 1 as a more expensive form of funding than debt; there is thus a 
tendency for banks to prefer highly-leveraged funding profiles,91 and 
thus to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements.  The higher cost of 
Common Equity Tier 1 is usually explained by reference to the higher 
required return on, and informational sensitivity of, equity, but as the 
discussion below will show, tax policies and other government subsidies 
for debt are the real drivers of banks’ preference for leverage. 
i. Required Return on Equity 
One reason generally cited for the higher cost of Common Equity 
Tier 1 vis-à-vis debt is that bank shareholders require a higher return on 
their shares than bank creditors do on their debt, in order to compensate 
the shareholders for the risk they take as residual claimants.92  But while 
it is true that shares do require a higher rate of return than debt, Admati 
and her colleagues have persuasively disputed that an increase in the 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Prior to its failure, Lehman Brothers had substantial amounts of hybrid 
instruments on its books. Fleischer, supra note 14, at 9.  One of the concerns regarding 
Lehman Brothers immediately prior to its bankruptcy was that the valuations of its 
assets were unclear, such that counterparties and regulators could not tell whether it had 
sufficient capital, or was insolvent.  As such, the market lacked confidence in Lehman 
as a counterparty, which compromised its access to short-term funding and thus its 
liquidity. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 324–
25 (2011).  For further discussion of the demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, 
see notes 241–47 and accompanying text. 
 90. The instability of financial institutions affects the availability of credit, and in 
turn, economic growth. Allen, supra note 14, at 9–10.  Because of this reduction in 
credit and economic growth, financial crises can result in increased unemployment, 
poverty and crime. Stephen L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207 (2008). 
 91. Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 20. 
 92.  
The expected return on equity is usually different than on debt because the investors’ 
returns are contingent on many unforeseeable factors related to the success of the 
firm’s business strategy. This contingency is typically perceived to make the equity 
investments riskier than investments in bonds (which are debt instruments), and, as a 
result, equity investors typically demand a higher return for their investments. 
Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1229. 
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percentage of Common Equity Tier 1 funding will, in and of itself, raise 
total funding costs for banks.93   Admati et al.’s conclusion is based on 
the work of Modigliani and Miller, which has been summarized as 
follows: 
[T]he Modigliani and Miller paradigm exposes the flaw in the 
following reasoning: “Equity is more expensive than debt because it 
is riskier. Thus, if a bank is forced to rely more on equity, its overall 
cost of finance will go up, and it will have to charge more for its 
loans.” The fallacy here is that the risk of equity, and hence its 
required return, is not a constant, but rather declines as leverage 
falls.  Indeed, when all the Modigliani and Miller conditions hold, 
this effect is just enough to offset the increased weight of the more-
expensive equity in the capital structure so that the overall cost of 
capital stays fixed as bank leverage varies.94 
It is therefore not axiomatic that it is more expensive for banks to 
fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1.  Although the 
required return on equity for a highly-leveraged bank will be higher than 
the interest rate on debt, as the risk profile of that bank is made more 
conservative with more Common Equity Tier 1 funding, both 
shareholders and debtholders will be subject to less risk and should 
demand less of a return, and thus the total cost of funding should not 
increase.95 
ii. Informational Sensitivity 
The higher cost of Common Equity Tier 1 has also been attributed 
to the increased informational sensitivity of equity,96 but just as with 
required return on equity, this higher cost is not a constant.  Generally 
speaking, debt is more informationally insensitive than shares because 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 16–17.  “‘Economizing’ on equity itself has an 
effect on the riskiness and, therefore, on the required expected return of equity. This 
effect must be taken into account when assessing the implications of increased equity 
capital requirements for banks’ cost of capital.” Id. at 17. 
 94. Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 17. 
 95. Admati et al. demonstrate this with the following numerical example: “[G]iven 
10% equity capital the required return was 15% for equity and 5% for debt, for an 
average cost of 10%×15% + 90%×5% = 6%. With 20% equity capital the required 
return for equity falls to 10% (with a 5% cost of debt), leading to the same average cost 
of 20%×10% + 80%×5% = 6%.” Admati et al., supra note 18, at 17 n.25. 
 96. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 8. 
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returns on debt are fixed, whereas returns on shares are much more 
volatile.97  So long as default by the debt issuer is unlikely, a debtholder 
only needs to know the terms of the debt instrument to determine the 
value of the debt, whereas a shareholder needs to know detailed 
information about the operations of the issuer of the shares in order to 
price those shares.  This informational insensitivity of debt ensures that 
it is more marketable then shares—much less diligence is required on 
the part of the purchasing investor—which increases the liquidity of 
debt and results in a discount in price when compared with shares.98  
However, as a bank’s risk profile becomes more leveraged (and thus the 
bank becomes more likely to default on its debt), the certainty that the 
bank will be able to meet its commitment to repay debt becomes 
compromised.  Potential debtholders must then devote more time to 
investigating the solvency of the bank, making debt more 
informationally sensitive, less liquid, and more expensive.99  Thus, if we 
focus on the total cost of a bank’s funding, while shares may be more 
informationally sensitive (and thus expensive) than debt, a larger 
cushion of Common Equity Tier 1 also preserves the informational 
insensitivity (and thus cheaper cost) of debt.  So, at least theoretically, 
the total cost of funding should not increase (and bank profits should not 
decrease) as leverage is decreased.100 
iii. Tax Policies and Other Subsidies for Debt 
In practice, however, lower leverage is more expensive for banks.  
This is largely a result of distortive tax policies and implicit government 
subsidies that favor debt.101  First, debt is rendered cheaper for banks 
because they have access to deposit insurance (which subsidizes the cost 
of “borrowing” from depositors), as well as access to emergency 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 26. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. There is, of course, an entire field of behavioral finance that repudiates (or at 
least discounts) the rationality of investors, suggesting that investors’ demand for return 
is motivated less by risk and informational asymmetries, and more by irrational 
sentiments and popular narratives. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE MARKET AND WHY 
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009).  This literature is compelling, but it is not 
considered in detail in this Article.  Because behavioral finance does not provide any 
unified explanation that suggests that equity is more expensive than debt, this Article 
does not need to rebut it. 
 101. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 3. 
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funding from central banks acting in their capacity as “lender of last 
resort” (which reduces the risk that banks will default on their non-
insured debt, making that debt cheaper for banks to issue).102  By the 
same logic, an implicit subsidy is conferred by governments—and 
therefore indirectly, by taxpayers—upon the debt of banks that are 
perceived to be “too big to fail”.103  Although financial reform efforts in 
the wake of the financial crisis have targeted this issue (for example, the 
United States’ Dodd-Frank Act describes itself as legislation that will 
“end ‘too big to fail’”), there is a general consensus that these subsidies 
persist notwithstanding the reforms that have been in put in place to 
date.104  In addition to these subsidies, most countries have tax rules in 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 23–24.  For further discussion of deposit insurance and central banks as 
lenders of last resort, see infra Part IV.A.  
 103. Acharaya and his colleagues have noted that government guarantees of too-big-
to-fail institutions make debt cheaper than equity.  Because of these guarantees, large, 
complex financial institutions “will have an incentive to lever up by borrowing at 
government-subsidized rates and investing in spread (or carry) trades.” Acharya et al., 
supra note 5, at 157.  Given this persistent implicit government backing, it makes little 
sense for these types of institutions to hold increased amounts of equity: with more 
equity, the bank’s shareholders would bear losses in a crisis, while an absence of equity 
would mean that those losses could be distributed to taxpayers in a bailout. KENNETH R. 
FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 55 (2010). 
 104. For a detailed discussion of the provisions of Dodd-Frank that purport to 
prevent future bailouts of financial institutions, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow 
Banking: An Overdue Reform that Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and Align 
U.S. and U.K. Regulation of Financial Conglomerates (Part 1), BANKING & FIN. 
SERVICES POL’Y REP., Mar. 2012, at 8–12.  Notwithstanding implementation of 
financial reform around the world, there is a general skepticism of the claim that the 
political powers that be will actually let such failures occur.  This is because there is no 
real credible alternative to a bail-out or an unwieldy bankruptcy of large financial 
institutions with international operations: “For a resolution process to have any chance 
of succeeding, it must be cross-border in scope; yet there are strong political reasons to 
believe that such an international agreement will be difficult or impossible to achieve . . 
. .” SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND 
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 207 (2010).  In the United States, for example, the 
orderly resolution authority conferred on the FDIC by Title II of Dodd-Frank does not 
cater to the complexity and transnational nature of large banks.  Furthermore, even 
post-Dodd-Frank, there is scope for federal assistance for financial institutions. See 
generally Wilmarth, Jr., supra at 8–12; Simon Johnson, The Myth of The Resolution 
Authority, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2011/03/31/the-myth-of-resolution-authority/; Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly 
and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 485 (2013).  As such, “despite all the 
. . . ‘no more taxpayer-funded bailout’ clamor included in recent financial reform 
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place that cause banks to favor debt over equity.105  As long as such tax 
rules and government subsidies remain in force, banks will have strong 
incentives to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements so as to enable 
them to increase their leverage. 
Since the financial crisis, a deep literature has emerged on how to 
end subsidies for institutions deemed “too big to fail”: many argue that 
this can only be achieved by drastic structural reform (proposals include 
breaking up the mega-banks 106  and ring-fencing their banking 
activities). 107   These proposals are worthy of consideration, but this 
Article does not seek to contribute to the literature on “too big to fail.”  
In addition, it does not seek to challenge the subsidies associated with 
deposit insurance, or access to central banks as lenders of last resort: the 
Article accepts that these subsidies are a worthwhile price to pay for 
policies that genuinely enhance financial stability.108  Instead, this paper 
focuses on the more neglected issue of how tax incentives affect banks, 
and leaves issues regarding government subsidies to other scholars. 
It would therefore be helpful to know from the outset just how 
much of banks’ preference towards debt is tax-driven, and how much is 
driven by government subsidies.  Unfortunately, as far as I am aware, 
there are no studies that directly address this issue.  There are some data 
available, though, on the value of the implicit “too big to fail” 
government subsidy: since the financial crisis, a number of studies have 
sought to quantify the impact of this subsidy on the funding cost for 
large banks.  The research of Baker and McArthur suggests that the 
value of the subsidy for large banks averaged 29 basis points over the 
period starting in 2000 and ending with the fall of Bear Stearns, and 
averaged 78 basis points in the period starting with the fall of Lehman 
                                                                                                                 
legislation, bailouts in the future are likely if circumstances become sufficiently 
severe.” Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 149, 224 (2010).  The continuing lower cost of funding for systemically 
important institutions reflects market support for this view. See Viral V. Acharya et al., 
The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees 20–
21 (Mar. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1961656. 
 105. Tim Edgar, Financial Instability, Tax Policy, and the Tax Expenditure 
Concept, 63 SMU L. REV. 969, 998, 1000 (2010).  These will be examined in detail in 
Section 4.A. 
 106. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 104, at 214–17. 
 107. See generally INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON BANKING, supra note 73; see also 
Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 1. 
 108. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 23–24. 
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Brothers and ending in the middle of 2009.109  Acharya, Anginer and 
Warburton found that the average value of the subsidy per year during 
the period from 1990 through 2010 was 28 basis points, peaking at an 
average of 120 basis points in 2009.110  The latter two studies considered 
only U.S. banks—Ueda and Weder di Mauro estimate that 
internationally, large banks had a funding cost advantage of roughly 60 
basis points at the end of 2007 and 80 basis points at the end of 2009.111  
Though the results of these studies vary, the consensus seems to be that 
the impact of being “too big to fail” on bank funding cost is usually well 
under 100 basis points (1.00%), although it becomes more valuable in 
the depths of a crisis.112 
“Too big to fail” institutions are not the only banks that receive 
government subsidies.  Around the world, most banks (no matter what 
their size) are beneficiaries of deposit insurance and have access to 
central banks as lenders of last resort.113  As far as I am aware, however, 
there are no studies that seek to quantify the “value” for banks of access 
to lenders of last resort.  The data are also sparse with respect to deposit 
insurance: most of the empirical studies consider how much it costs 
deposit insurers to provide insurance,114 rather than the value of that 
deposit insurance to banks.  One study, however, does consider the 
impact of the introduction of deposit insurance on deposit interest rates 
(i.e., the cost of deposit funding) for banks around the world. 115  
Somewhat counter-intuitively, this study finds that when deposit 
                                                                                                                 
 109. DEAN BAKER & TRAVIS MCARTHUR, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, 
THE VALUE OF THE “TOO BIG TO FAIL” BIG BANK SUBSIDY 2 (2009). 
 110. Acharya, et. al., supra note 104, at 4.  The study also found that subsidies 
persist notwithstanding the passage of Dodd-Frank. Id. at 19–20. 
 111. Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy 
Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 12/128, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf. 
 112. Although we have no data on the value to banks of access to central banks as 
lenders of last resort, presumably this would also be higher during a crisis. 
 113. See infra notes 332–35 and accompanying text. 
 114. For a survey of this literature, see Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther, 
Explicit and Implicit Costs of Government-Provided Deposit Insurance 30 (2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083662. 
 115. Francesca Carapella & Giorgio Di Giorgio, Deposit Insurance, Institutions and 
Bank Interest Rates 1 (Columbia Univ. Dept. of Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Paper 
No. 0304-06, 2003), available at http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ 
ac:116049. 
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insurance is introduced in a country, it has very little impact on the 
interest rates that banks in that country pay on deposits,116 suggesting 
that the deposit insurance subsidy isn’t overly valuable to banks. 
Turning now to tax, there is a sizable empirical literature that 
investigates the impact of tax policies on the cost of debt and equity for 
corporations generally.  Most of the studies on corporate debt bias relate 
to individual countries, however, and because of differences among 
countries’ corporate tax rates, tax treatment of investor income, and 
accounting policies, it is difficult to generalize about how much of the 
cost of equity can be traced back to tax policies.  That said, the empirical 
work that has been done on individual G7 countries indicates that 
“[t]hese distortions create advantages to the use of debt measurable in 
hundreds of basis points.”117   Although this literature does not look 
specifically at banks,118  banks face the same tax incentives as other 
corporations119 and so the findings regarding corporations can act as a 
rough guide to the impact of tax policies on the cost of bank funding.120 
And so we have data which suggest that the availability of deposit 
insurance has little impact on banks’ cost of deposit funding, the “too 
big to fail” subsidy is usually worth much less than a hundred basis 
points, and that tax distortions affect funding decisions in the order of 
hundreds of basis points.  Furthermore, the value of the “too big to fail” 
subsidy seems to be cyclical (it is more valuable in bad times), whereas 
tax distortions are constant.  This analysis of the relative impact of tax 
policies and other subsidies on the cost of bank debt and equity is very 
ad hoc, and would benefit from further research by economists.  
Nonetheless, it suggests that addressing tax incentives that favor debt is 
the reform that will have the single biggest impact on bank incentives to 
arbitrage regulatory capital requirements.  Indeed, there is already a 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 19.  The authors note that though deposit insurance does not significantly 
impact deposit interest rates, it does encourage banks to make riskier loans with higher 
interest rates. 
 117. Michael Keen, Alexander Klemm & Victoria Perry, Tax and the Crisis, 31 
FISCAL STUD. 43, 49 (2010), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ 
j.1475-5890.2010.00107.x/pdf. 
 118. Id. at 52. 
 119. Id. 
 120. “[T]he size of the effects of corporate taxation on the financial structure of 
banks is close to the ones for non-financial firms.” Serena Fatica, Thomas Hemmelgarn 
& Gaetan Nicodeme, The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: Consequences and Solutions 9 
(European Comm’n Taxation Papers, Paper No. 33, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic
_analysis/tax_papers/taxation_paper_33_en.pdf. 
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broad consensus that banks will not issue hybrid instruments if those 
hybrids do not receive preferential tax treatment,121 which suggests that 
only the significant tax savings associated with debt-equity hybrids 
justify the costs associated with developing and marketing those 
instruments (i.e., that government subsidies alone do not make hybrids 
sufficiently attractive to banks).122  If we can address tax incentives so 
that Common Equity Tier 1, hybrids, and debt are all treated the same 
from a tax perspective, we can therefore quash bank incentives to 
develop new and complicated debt-equity hybrids. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH HYBRID INSTRUMENTS 
Given banks’ general preference for debt over equity as a funding 
source, it is not surprising that banks have sought to develop instruments 
that have enough equity-like features to be counted as regulatory capital, 
but also have debt-like features that make the instruments cheaper than 
Common Equity Tier 1.123  Basel I and II were amenable to counting 
these “hybrid debt capital instruments” as part of banks’ regulatory 
capital, so long as: 
 they [were] unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up; 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 168.  Given that the United States Internal 
Revenue Service is unlikely to treat cocos as debt, U.S. banks may not end up issuing 
cocos. Viva Hammer, Sam Chen & Paul Carman, Tax Treatment of Contingent 
Convertible Bonds, DERIVATIVES & FIN. INSTRUMENTS 97 (2011).  It has also been 
suggested that (tax issues aside) for cocos to really take-off, cocos need to be classified 
as debt in order to appeal to the large fixed income market. LOUISE PITT ET AL., 
CONTINGENT CAPITAL: POSSIBILITIES, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4–5 (2011), 
available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-
reform/contingent-capital.pdf 
 122. Stephen Fiamma, tax partner at Allen & Overy, pithily summed up this 
attitude: “Banks and lawyers are working hard to come up with the holy grail of an 
instrument that meets both Basel requirements and the IRS requirements for tax 
deductibility.  Until that happens, why would any bank bother with CoCos?”  Liam 
Vaughn, Basel Regulators Force Banks to Cut Plans for Contingent Convertible Bonds, 
BLOOMBERG, July 19, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-19/basel-
regulators-force-banks-to-cut-contingent-convertible-plans.html. 
 123. “[Hybrids’] appeal to issuers is that they look like relatively cheap equity.” 
Anousha Sakoui et al., Regulatory Thaw Helps Hybrid Return, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 
2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fc74723a-9f48-11df-8732-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz24PujkslK; see also Candemir Baltali & Joseph Tanega, Basel III: Dehybridization 
of Capital, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 24–26 (2011). 
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 they [were] not redeemable at the initiative of the holder or 
without the prior consent of the supervisory authority; 
 they [were] available to participate in losses without the bank 
being obliged to cease trading (unlike conventional subordinated 
debt); 
 although the capital instrument may carry an obligation to pay 
interest that cannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike 
dividends on ordinary shareholders’ equity), it should allow 
service obligations to be deferred (as with cumulative preference 
shares) where the profitability of the bank would not support 
payment.124 
 
Although these requirements ensured that hybrid instruments had 
some equity-like characteristics, hybrids remained inferior substitutes 
for Common Equity Tier 1 because they were not sufficiently loss-
absorbent.125  This is largely due to one debt-like characteristic of hybrid 
instruments (which was common to most hybrid instruments issued 
prior to the financial crisis): the amounts due thereunder remained 
constant even in the face of declining values of the very assets they 
financed.126  Therefore, just as with more traditional debt instruments, 
reductions in asset values had the potential to trigger destructive 
deleveraging behavior. 127   Furthermore, the debt overhang problem 
applied to these hybrid instruments in the same way it applied to debt,128 
albeit to a lesser degree, because holders of hybrid instruments had more 
senior claims on the assets of the bank than holders of Common Equity 
Tier 1.129  Although investors in hybrids were typically subordinated to 
other debt creditors,130 this fact provided little comfort to new investors 
in shares: new investors feared that any new capital they invested would 
be wiped out in satisfying the more senior claims of the hybrid 
                                                                                                                 
 124. BASEL I, supra note 8, at 16. 
 125. Baltali & Tanega, supra note 123, at 24. 
 126. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 10–11.  The BCBS has sought to address this 
issue in Basel III by requiring that hybrid instruments include provisions that allow 
them to be written-down, or converted into common equity.  These new requirements 
are discussed infra, Part II.B. 
 127. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 129. Baltali & Tanega, supra note 123, at 27–28. 
 130. See id.; Admati et al., supra note 18, at 10. 
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instrument holders. 131   Accordingly, hybrid instruments impeded 
recapitalization in a way that Common Equity Tier 1 does not. 
In addition, Common Equity Tier 1 is relatively transparent and 
simple to understand, at least when compared with more complex hybrid 
sources of funding.132  Other things being equal, market participants are 
more likely to have confidence in the solvency of a bank with a funding 
cushion made up of Common Equity Tier 1, as opposed to a funding 
cushion comprised of less predictable hybrid instruments.133  This type 
of market confidence reduces the risk of runs on such bank’s short-term 
funding, and thus reduces liquidity risk for the bank and makes it more 
stable. 134   In contrast, relying on complex and unpredictable hybrid 
instruments leaves more scope for uncertainty and panic—and this is not 
just a problem at the individual bank level.  Hybrids also increase the 
amount of risk in the financial system as a whole: complex instruments 
may “creat[e] complications that increase the likelihood that [defaults] 
will occur and diminish the ability of investors and other market 
participants to anticipate and avoid these [defaults].” 135   In contrast, 
Common Equity Tier 1 is relatively simple and well-understood, and 
therefore is less likely to exacerbate systemic risk.136  
To make this hypothetical discussion of the inferiority of hybrid 
instruments more concrete, Part II.A looks in detail at the performance 
during the financial crisis of one particular hybrid instrument, the trust 
preferred security or “TruPS.” 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 9. 
 132. The IMF notes that the use of hybrids results in “increased complexity and 
opacity of financial arrangements.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 11. 
 133. Baltali & Tanega, supra note 123, at 20–21. 
 134. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 135. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity In Financial Markets, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 211, 214 (2009).  For a general discussion of the problems associated with 
introducing complex new financial products into an already complex financial system, 
see generally Allen, supra note 14.   
 136. “The purported purpose of whittling down the hybrid capital instruments and 
phasing out innovative hybrid instruments is to reduce the specter of future 
idiosyncratic and systemic crises in the international banking sector.” Baltali & Tanega, 
supra note 123, at 17; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 11. 
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A. TRUST PREFERRED SHARES – A CAUTIONARY TALE 
The TruPS is a type of hybrid security that became extremely 
popular in the United States in the years prior to the financial crisis.137  
TruPSs are created when a bank (or bank holding company (“BHC”))138 
issues subordinated debt to a trust company, and then that trust company 
issues preferred shares to investors.139  Investors are paid dividends on 
the preferred shares, and those dividend payments are funded by the 
interest payments on the subordinated debt made by the bank or BHC to 
the trust.140  Because TruPSs are structured so that the bank or BHC 
makes interest payments on the subordinated debt rather than paying 
dividends on the preferred shares, the return on these instruments is tax-
deductible at the bank/BHC level, and so they are cheaper to issue than 
shares.141  Usually, TruPSs mature after 30 years, and allow for the 
suspension of dividend payments for up to five years during that 30-year 
period142; while dividend payments to TruPSs holders are suspended, 
dividends continue to accumulate, and no dividend can be paid to any 
common shareholder of the bank or BHC while dividends are owed to 
TruPSs holders.143  Because TruPSs allow for dividend accumulation, 
pursuant to the criteria set forth in Basel I and II, TruPSs could not be 
used to satisfy “core” capital requirements for banks.144  Banks could 
use TruPSs as “supplementary” capital, however.145  Furthermore, the 
United States Federal Reserve developed a special rule for BHCs in 
1996, allowing BHCs (but not banks)146 to satisfy up to 25% of their 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 176; UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, DODD-FRANK ACT: HYBRID 
CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS AND SMALL INSTITUTION ACCESS TO CAPITAL 11–12 (2012), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587759.pdf. 
 138. A “bank holding company” is a company that owns or controls a bank in the 
United States. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (2006). 
 139. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 2 n.2. 
 140. Id.  “The bank holding company has 100 percent ownership of the trust and 
usually guarantees the interest and principal payments of the TruPs.” Acharya et al., 
supra note 5, at 161. 
 141. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 175. 
 142. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 11–12. 
 143. Id. at 24. 
 144. Basel I provides that “cumulative preferred stock” does not qualify as “Tier 1” 
or “core” capital under the Basel I standards. BASEL I, supra note 8, at 3. 
 145. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 146. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 2. 
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“core” capital requirement with TruPSs,147 so long as they “provide[d] 
for a minimum five-year consecutive deferral period on distributions to 
preferred shareholders . . . [and were] subordinated to all subordinated 
debt and have the longest feasible maturity.”148 
Even though TruPSs can be quite expensive to implement,149 they 
were cheaper than issuing common shares,150 and the combination of 
regulatory endorsement and cheaper cost led to rapid growth in the 
United States TruPSs market from 1996 onwards, particularly amongst 
BHCs.  By December of 2010, BHCs had outstanding over $128 billion 
of TruPSs, representing 10% of all BHC Tier 1 capital.151  In hindsight, 
however, the inferiority of TruPSs to Common Equity Tier 1 is clear, 
and the popularity TruPSs enjoyed as regulatory capital was 
problematic.  TruPSs entail a contractual obligation to repay the full 
principal amount after a fixed term (usually 30 years), and also include a 
contractual entitlement to dividends.  While payment of dividends can 
be suspended for up to five years, they will accumulate in the interim.152   
Holders of TruPSs therefore have a fixed claim on the assets of the 
issuing bank, so TruPSs do not absorb losses as smoothly as Common 
Equity Tier 1 (holders of common equity have no fixed claim to any 
repayment).153  Because holders of TruPSs have claims on the issuing 
bank that are senior to those of the bank’s common shareholders (and 
because suspension of dividend payments on TruPSs also required 
suspension of dividend payments on common shares), TruPSs also 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 175.  The concept of “bank holding company” 
regulation is a uniquely American construct. Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, 
That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company 
Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 114 (2011).  As such, 
the BCBS does not expressly address bank holding companies in its standards, but the 
United States opted to implement the majority of the Basel I, II and III standards for 
bank holding companies as well as banks: one notable deviation from these standards 
was to allow BHCs to count TruPSs towards their core regulatory capital requirements. 
UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 7. 
 148. Press Release, Federal Reserve, Board Approval of the Use of Certain 
Cumulative Preferred Stock Instruments in Tier 1 Capital for Bank Holding Companies 
(Oct. 21, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/ 
1996/19961021/default.htm. 
 149. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 175. 
 150. Id. at 176. 
 151. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 13. 
 152. Id. at 21–22. 
 153. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
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perpetuate the debt overhang problem and make recapitalization more 
difficult.154 
In addition to being inferior from a loss-absorbency and 
recapitalization perspective, TruPSs provide a good illustration of the 
unnecessary complexity and uncertainty that can be created when hybrid 
debt-equity instruments are developed to arbitrage regulatory capital 
requirements.  For example, the dividend suspension feature was 
included in TruPSs solely to ensure that they could be counted as 
regulatory capital. 155   This suspension feature would make the 
instruments more “equity-like,” because it would mean that TruPS 
holders had no right to fixed payment from the issuer during the 
suspension period (instruments are more loss-absorbent when they don’t 
entitle the holder to a fixed payment). 156   However, contractual 
mechanisms in hybrid instruments do not always work as envisaged.  
During the financial crisis, many TruPS issuers did not exercise their 
contractual right to suspend dividend payments, because of the fear that 
the suspension would be viewed as a “red flag” by the market, and 
induce short-selling that would reduce the price of the issuer’s common 
stock and otherwise make funding in the capital markets more 
difficult.157  Where dividends were not suspended, the loss-absorbency 
promise of TruPSs was not realized.  Many other TruPS issuers did 
suspend dividend payments, however, 158  which meant that the 
instruments operated inconsistently in the market, generating uncertainty 
amongst current and potential investors. 
Finally, because TruPSs were considered cheaper than common 
shares, and because the BCBS (and particularly in the case of BHCs, the 
Federal Reserve) had given these instruments their imprimatur,159 many 
smaller banks and BHCs sought a way to enter the TruPS market.  
However, the implementation costs seemed prohibitive for many smaller 
                                                                                                                 
 154. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 24.  See 
supra note 84 and accompanying text for further discussion of the debt overhang 
problem. 
 155. Press Release, Federal Reserve, supra note 148. 
 156. INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON BANKING, supra note 73, at 86. 
 157. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 23. 
 158. “As of February 2010, nearly 270 U.S. small banks had deferred interest 
payments on their trust preferred securities.” Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 177. 
 159. “[L]egal and regulatory regimes did not discourage, limit or prohibit excessive 
hybridization but rather provided an imprimatur for the issuance and trade of hybrid 
capital structures to the detriment of the entire global banking system.” Baltali & 
Tanega, supra note 123, at 4. 
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institutions.160  The solution to this problem was to add another layer of 
complexity to the financial system by pooling and securitizing the 
TruPSs of smaller institutions, creating collateralized debt obligations 
(“CDOs”).161  This worked well for a time, but as the market for CDOs 
dried up during the financial crisis, smaller BHCs could no longer sell 
their TruPSs and were deprived of a source of capital on which they had 
come to rely.  Without this source of capital, many institutions found 
themselves in financial difficulty, and would have benefitted from the 
ability to renegotiate the terms of the TruPSs with investors, or to offer 
an exchange of TruPSs for common shares.162  Unfortunately, because 
so many TruPSs were pooled and securitized, it was difficult for 
individual TruPS issuers to “identify and gain approval for 
recapitalization transactions from the ultimate . . . investors.”163  The 
final result was that a sizable number of smaller BHCs defaulted on their 
TruPSs payment obligations 164  (and many others still have these 
instruments on their books, impeding recapitalization).165 
The inadequacy of TruPSs as loss-absorbent capital affected all 
institutions.  The funding difficulties experienced by institutions that had 
pooled their TruPSs primarily affected smaller BHCs.  Fortunately, 
because systemically important financial institutions were not greatly 
affected, the consequences of TruPSs’ complexities did not really 
reverberate around the financial system.  Nonetheless, the experience 
with TruPSs illustrates that untested hybrid instruments often do not 
react as expected during crisis situations.  Because of the problems 
associated with TruPSs, they are now being phased out of the regulatory 
capital regime in the United States, but this transition will be 
complicated and time consuming.166  TruPSs should therefore serve as a 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 176. 
 161. Id. 
 162. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 25. 
 163. Id. 
 164. “According to a leading credit rating agency, of the 605 banking institutions in 
pooled trust preferred securities that have deferred dividends since January 1, 2007, 
some . . . 29 percent have defaulted . . . .” Id. at 23. 
 165. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 177. 
 166. Acharya et al. describe the transitional arrangements as follows: “[Dodd-Frank] 
gives banks with more than $100 billion in capital up to five years to phase out these 
securities and up to 10 years for institutions with capital between $15 billion and $100 
billion.  As a compromise, the amendment exempts small banks with capital less than 
$15 billion and allows them to continue to treat existing TruPSs on the balance sheet as 
Tier 1 capital. . . .  Moody’s Investors Service estimates that in total nearly $118 billion 
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cautionary tale, and regulators should be wary of endorsing complicated 
and untested instruments by allowing them to count towards a bank’s (or 
a BHC’s) regulatory capital requirements. 
B. COCOS: THE NEXT GENERATION OF HYBRIDS 
Because of the poor performance of TruPSs and other hybrid 
instruments during the financial crisis, such instruments came under 
scrutiny by the BCBS as it developed Basel III.167  The result is that 
Basel III requires banks to satisfy much more of their regulatory capital 
requirements with Common Equity Tier 1, and phases out the use of 
some hybrid instruments.168  However, Basel III still allows some hybrid 
instruments to be counted towards regulatory capital169 so long as they 
can be written-down or converted into common shares170 (the BCBS has 
determined that such features will make the hybrid instruments more 
loss-absorbent).171  As such, Basel III does not reject hybrid instruments 
                                                                                                                 
of TruPSs will be disqualified from Tier 1 treatment across all bank holding 
companies.” Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 161–62. “[M]any of [the five-year dividend 
suspension periods] will expire around the same time as banks are supposed to be 
phasing out trust-preferred securities under Basel III. The timing leaves those banks a 
little more than a year to earn enough to start winding down their reliance on the 
securities. Some banks that issued trust-preferred securities may have to sell or file for 
bankruptcy protection if they are unable to find another solution.” Rachel Witkowski, 
Pressure Mounts for Banks to Unload Trust-Preferred Securities, AM. BANKER, Aug. 
22, 2012, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_163/pressure-
mounts-for-banks-to-unload-trups-1052053-1.html. 
 167. Hybrids also came under scrutiny at the national level in the United States, with 
section 171 of Dodd-Frank effectively prohibiting bank holding companies from 
satisfying their Tier 1 regulatory capital requirements with TruPSs.  Furthermore, 
section 174 of Dodd-Frank required the GAO to carry out a study of the use of hybrid 
instruments to satisfy regulatory capital requirements for bank holding companies.  The 
results of this study were set out in UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 137. 
 168. “Innovative hybrid capital instruments with an incentive to redeem through 
features such as step-up clauses, currently limited to 15% of the Tier 1 capital base, will 
be phased out.” BASEL III, supra note 10, at 2. 
 169. Under Basel III, banks can use hybrids to satisfy regulatory capital 
requirements in an amount equal to 3.5% of risk-weighted assets. See supra notes 48–
51 and accompanying text for further discussion of quantitative capital requirements 
under Basel III. 
 170. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 21. 
 171. Id. 
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entirely; instead, it seeks to limit the quantity and improve the quality of 
hybrid regulatory capital.172 
In response to Basel III’s new qualitative requirements for hybrid 
instruments, banks and national regulators have taken a keen interest in 
a new type of instrument known as a “contingent convertible bond” or 
“coco.”173  While there is no official definition of what constitutes a 
“coco,” 174  as generally conceived, a coco is a hybrid debt-equity 
instrument that starts its life as a debt instrument (like a bond) but will 
convert to common shares upon the occurrence of a “trigger event,” thus 
providing the issuing bank with a fresh infusion of common shares.175  
This trigger event is the novel and distinguishing feature of a coco, and 
is intended to address the loss-absorbency problem posed by previous 
generations of hybrids: once the trigger event occurs, the instrument will 
automatically and irrevocably convert from debt into loss-absorbent 
common shares.176  However, there is not yet a consensus about what 
should constitute a trigger event.  Some prefer market-based triggers, 
such that sufficiently large decreases in the share price or increases in 
the CDS spread of the issuing bank would trigger conversion.177  Others 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Id. 
 173. The Swiss have been at the forefront of implementing national infrastructure 
for coco issuances.  For further discussion of the Swiss treatment of cocos, see Allen, 
supra note 36, at 138–39; Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 244–45.  British and 
German authorities have also given serious thought to implementing national regimes 
for cocos. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 243, 245–46.  The U.S. has to date 
been more cautious about cocos, concluding that they should remain a matter for 
private sector experimentation for now. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
supra note 26, at 3.  To date, only Lloyds, Credit Suisse, Rabobank and Barclays have 
engaged in coco issuances, but other banks have shown interest in the instrument. See 
Allen, supra note 36, at 139–40.  For example, Bank of America Merrill Lynch has also 
commented on investor demand for cocos. Matthew Attwood, Basel Pops CoCo Market 
Hope, REUTERS, June 27, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/27/us-coco-
credit-ifr-idUSTRE75Q2BX20110627.  Regarding previous issuances, see Allen, supra 
note 36, at 139–40, and Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 246. 
 174. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 34–37, have summarized in tabular 
form some of the varied design features proposed for cocos. 
 175. CEYLA PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, CONTINGENT 
CAPITAL: ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND DESIGN FEATURES 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf. 
 176. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 18. 
 177. See, e.g., Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 17; PITT ET AL., supra note 
121.  Coffee and Kaal & Henkel support the use of market-based triggers. John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need For 
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view these market-based triggers as inviting market manipulation.178 
Some prefer a trigger that is based on the issuing bank’s regulatory 
capital ratio; 179 however, this is potentially subject to accounting 
manipulation by the issuing bank, and in any event can prove a lagging 
indicator of the bank’s health. 180   Finally, some have expressed a 
preference for giving financial regulators discretion in determining 
whether a trigger event has occurred,181 but this type of trigger breeds 
uncertainty in the market and the risk of this type of conversion could 
prove impossible to price. 182   Furthermore, some have expressed 
concerns regarding the reluctance of regulators to actually call a trigger 
event, for fear of sending a negative signal about the issuing bank to the 
market.183 
Much of the current academic discussion of cocos focuses on these 
trigger design issues.184  However, as I have argued elsewhere, cocos are 
problematic notwithstanding the design of the trigger event, because 
they incentivize behavior that is likely to detrimentally impact 
confidence in, and thus the liquidity of, the issuing bank, potentially 
bringing about the failure of the very institution that the cocos were 
intended to recapitalize.185  The thesis of my argument is that, at the time 
of purchase, buyers of cocos will tend to underestimate the risk of 
                                                                                                                 
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 830–31 (2011); see 
also Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 232. 
 178. “Price manipulation (via short-selling) and the self-fulfilling threat of equity 
dilution could inflict a confidence-induced downward spiral that eventually triggers 
conversion.” PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., supra note 175, at 24. 
 179. The cocos issued by Lloyds in 2009 had a capital based trigger: they included a 
provision that the notes would convert into a fixed number of common equity shares if 
the ratio of Lloyd’s core Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets were to fall below 5%.  
ASS’N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, PREVENTION AND CURE: SECURING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY AFTER THE CRISIS (2010). 
 180. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 169; Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 16. 
 181. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 21. 
 182. ASS’N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, supra note 179, at 48–49; PITT ET AL., supra 
note 121, at 13. 
 183. “[R]egulators and supervisors have shown time and again that they are hesitant 
to opine negatively about SIFIs in a way that will become public.  Such forbearance 
leads to protracted delays in recognizing problems.” Calomiris & Herring, supra note 
63, at 16. 
 184. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent 
Capital in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 
287, 299–302 (2012). 
 185. Allen, supra note 36, at 128. 
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conversion into common shares186 (both because of cognitive biases187 
and computer-based risk models that tend to underestimate the 
occurrence of low-probability events188), and so the risk of conversion 
will not be properly reflected in the coco price.  At a later date, if the 
trigger event and the accompanying automatic and irrevocable 
conversion into common shares suddenly do seem likely, this will spur a 
flurry of panic selling (both of the cocos themselves and of stock of the 
issuing bank), short selling of the issuing bank’s stock, and purchases of 
credit default swaps that reference the issuing bank. 189   All of this 
activity (and its impact on stock prices and CDS spreads) is likely to 
damage confidence in the issuing bank,190 and this damaged confidence 
is likely to manifest itself in runs on short-term funding – the issuing 
bank is thus liable to experience a liquidity crisis from which 
recapitalization from coco conversion may be unable to save it. 191  
While there is surprisingly little discussion in the literature as to how 
much recapitalization would be needed (and therefore, how much 
contingent capital would need to be issued and convert) to return a 
distressed bank to health, the IMF has cast some doubt on the view that 
a bank could ever hold enough convertible capital to forestall a liquidity 
crisis.192  As Joseph Sommer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. at 157. 
 187. “Individuals tend to ignore low probability catastrophic events.” Henry T.C. 
Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise 
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1488 (1993). 
 188. For example, most financial institutions use some form of VaR, or value-at-
risk, model to calculate how much they stand to lose on investments on any given day.  
However, the VaR model relies on historical data to calculate future risk – “VaR 
estimates future losses based on the assumption that the market will perform in the 
future as it performed in the past.” Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-
Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 55, 71 (2011).  As such, VaR discounts low probability losses that are not 
reflected in historical data (what constitutes “low probability” varies from model to 
model, depending on the historical data inputted and the institution’s confidence level). 
For further discussion, see Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail Risk Metric: 
Disclosures, Derivatives, and the Measurement of Financial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1461, 1462–65 (2010). 
 189. Allen, supra note 36, at 158–60. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 162. 
 192. “[F]orestalling a liquidity crisis with convertible debt would require large 
amounts of such debt and may require extending the coverage of debt-equity 
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noted, “[b]alance-sheet capital isn’t too relevant if you’re suffering a 
massive run.”193  The only option left open to the bank at this point 
would be to seek liquidity assistance from the central bank in its 
capacity as the “lender of last resort,”194 invoking the very government 
intervention that cocos were designed to avoid.195 
The potential for cocos to trigger runs thus militates against any 
regulatory endorsement of these instruments: the harm that cocos can 
cause derives from their status as an indicator of the issuing bank’s 
health, so it is not enough to just reduce the percentage of regulatory 
capital that can be comprised of cocos—even a small number of cocos 
issued to raise regulatory capital can be problematic.  And cocos don’t 
just pose risks to individual banks: there is a systemic risk dimension to 
these instruments as well.196  The conversion of one bank’s cocos and 
their attendant loss in value may require any other banks that have 
invested in those cocos to start selling assets in order to deleverage.197  
Furthermore, to the extent that investor banks keep the converted shares 
of the coco issuer, they will find themselves residual claimants in the 
coco issuer (whereas before they were higher ranking debt-holders), 
increasing inter-bank exposure and interconnectedness.198  Conversion 
of one bank’s cocos is also likely to make the markets skittish about 
cocos in general (even cocos that are issued by banks that seem to be 
stable), potentially encouraging panicked sell-offs of cocos that would 
                                                                                                                 
conversion to unsecured senior debt under the bail-in schemes.” PAZARBASIOGLU ET 
AL., supra note 175, at 16. 
 193. Email from Joseph Sommer, Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to 
Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Research Director, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System et al. (July 13, 2008), Re: another option we should present re triparty?; 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 324. 
 194. Central banks perform the role of lender of last resort by making loans to 
distressed banks which are secured by the bank’s assets, effectively creating a market 
for the bank’s assets when there is no public market for them. Thomas M. Humphrey, 
Lender of Last Resort: What It Is, Whence It Came, and Why The Fed Isn’t It, 30 CATO 
J. 333, 355 (2010). 
 195. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 26. 
 196. Systemic risk has been defined as “the risk that (i) an economic shock such as 
market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the 
failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its 
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.” Schwarcz, 
supra note 90, at 204. 
 197. Charles A.E. Goodhart, Are CoCos from Cloud Cuckoo-Land?, VOX (June 10, 
2010), http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5159. 
 198. See id. 
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destroy their value. 199   Again, to the extent that other banks have 
invested in cocos and are seeing their value fall, this may necessitate 
destructive deleveraging by those other banks.200 
Cocos thus seem inherently problematic from a systemic stability 
perspective.  From the perspective of issuing banks, cocos’ one 
redeeming feature seems to be the lower cost associated with cocos 
because of debt-like tax treatment.201  Nonetheless, cocos continue to 
receive support from many academics and policymakers.202  One strand 
of literature that has recently developed in support of cocos stresses the 
benefits they provide as a tool for governance, by incentivizing both 
existing shareholders and coco holders to improve discipline of coco 
issuers.203  The discussion below will demonstrate, however, that many 
of these governance benefits are overstated,204 and they do not justify the 
systemic risks posed by the instruments. 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id. 
 200. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 201. Acharya et al. comment that “bankers like it only if it is capital for regulatory 
purposes and debt for tax purposes . . . .” Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 168.  It should 
be noted, though, that at this stage it is not certain whether all nations will treat cocos as 
debt for tax purposes.  Switzerland has indicated that it will, which has likely been 
crucial to the development of cocos in that country. Elena Logutenkova & Klaus Wille, 
UBS, Credit Suisse May Need to Boost Capital to 19%, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 4, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-04/ubs-credit-suisse-must-boost-capital-to-
meet-swiss-regulator-requirements.html.  The FSOC has indicated that, in the United 
States, cocos would not be tax-deductible: “There would be substantial challenges to 
characterizing [contingent capital] as debt for U.S. income tax purposes.” FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 17.  In that case, U.S. banks would 
likely have little incentive to issue contingent capital. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 
168. 
 202. See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 203. The BCBS briefly refers to the potential governance benefits of cocos and 
suggests that they might result in, for example, “the bank maintaining a cushion of 
common equity above the trigger level, a pre-emptive issuance of new equity to avoid 
conversion, or more prudent management of ‘tail-risks.’” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 18.  For a more in-depth discussion of the governance 
benefits of cocos, see Coffee, supra note 177, at 795, Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27; 
and Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63. 
 204. Admati et al. share this skepticism of the governance benefits provided by 
cocos – they note: “We have seen no compelling argument that contingent capital that 
has a debt-like structure prior to conversion has a positive impact on governance 
problems sufficient to justify including it in capital regulation.” Admati et al., supra 
note 18, at 55. 
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i. Shareholder Discipline 
Professor Coffee makes a persuasive argument that, prior to the 
financial crisis, “shareholder pressure led managers to take on higher 
leverage and accept greater risk in the boom years—with catastrophic 
consequences [ . . . ].”205  Proponents of the governance benefits of 
cocos (including Coffee) argue that the incentives of existing bank 
shareholders can be reoriented so that they resist highly-leveraged risk 
profiles,206 if those shareholders fear the dilution that will follow coco 
conversion.207  This begs a question: if shareholders were willing to push 
management for increased leverage and short-term profits prior to the 
financial crisis, even in the face of the potential failure of the firm 
(which would wipe out shareholder interests entirely), then why would 
the mere fear of dilution by coco conversion be enough to incentivize 
shareholders not to push for leverage in the future? 
At least in the context of banks that are perceived as “too big to 
fail,” there is a plausible answer to this conundrum: shareholders in 
these banks do not truly expect to be wiped out, because they expect that 
such banks will be bailed out by the government.208  There is arguably 
less scope for government intervention in coco conversion (especially if 
the cocos are triggered by a more objective capital- or market-based 
mechanism),209  and therefore shareholders of “too big to fail” banks 
might fear conversion/dilution more than they do bank failure.  
However, it is wrong to say that cocos preclude government intervention 
entirely.  Especially if the cocos are structured so that they are triggered 
at the discretion of the regulator, it is quite plausible that markets will 
expect forbearance from the government with respect to 
                                                                                                                 
 205. Coffee, supra note 177, at 810–11. 
 206. Id. at 807, 828; Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 13.  The BCBS argues, 
in a similar vein, that shareholder governance benefits will accrue if “a sufficiently high 
number of new shares are created upon conversion to make the common shareholders 
suffer a loss from dilution.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 
18. 
 207. Kaal & Henkel propose a model that allows for a change of control following 
coco conversion, and argue that fear of loss of control will create similar salutary 
incentives for bank shareholders. Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 264. 
 208. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 3.  This expectation was generally 
honored (other than for shareholders in Lehman Brothers) during the Financial Crisis, 
and likely persists notwithstanding the innovations made by Dodd-Frank and other 
financial reforms around the world. See notes 103–07 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of this issue. 
 209. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 4. 
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conversion/dilution in the same way that they currently expect a 
bailout.210  Furthermore, it is not outside the realm of possibility that 
even with capital- or market-based triggers, national governments could 
become so nervous about the systemic effects of the conversion of a 
particular bank’s cocos211 that they would intervene to avoid conversion 
(or at least markets might calculate that governments might take such an 
approach).212  In any of these circumstances, shareholders would have 
no more incentive than they do now to agitate for more prudent 
leverage. 
Assuming, however, that existing bank shareholders do fear 
dilution by way of coco conversion more than they fear the failure of the 
bank itself, the corporate governance literature suggests other reasons to 
be skeptical about the discipline that such shareholders might exert.213  
Most fundamentally, an expectation of this type of discipline is 
premised on the willingness and ability of shareholders to work together 
in pressuring management to generate stable profits over the longer-
term. Shareholders would, with reasonable consistency, have to be 
content to forego short-term profits—which can be magnified by 
leverage—in favor of longer-term stability.  This would only work if the 
bulk of shareholders were committed to holding the bank stock for 
reasonably long periods of time.214  The data show, however, a trend in 
                                                                                                                 
 210. If regulators believe that coco conversion will have a negative signaling effect 
about the issuing bank (which is quite likely), then they may drag their feet in ordering 
a conversion. See PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., supra note 175, at 25.  Coffee, supra note 
177, at 806, notes that there is always a concern that “regulators, because of political or 
legal controversies, will fail to intervene.” 
 211. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text. 
 212. Such a “too big to convert” subsidy would therefore make cocos less costly 
than they should otherwise be, and thus more popular for banks to issue.  This could 
potentially create an asset bubble.  For further discussion of moral hazard issues 
relating to coco conversion, see Coffee, supra note 177, at 840–41. 
 213. A significant body of empirical literature calls into question the desirability of 
shareholder governance.  For a survey of this literature, see Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 798–803 (2007).  
However, this Article will not address this literature: it proceeds on the assumption that 
shareholder governance can be beneficial, and focuses on questioning the efficacy of 
bank shareholder governance. 
 214. Shareholder short-termism persists, notwithstanding that many measures have 
been proposed to try and curb it. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, OVERCOMING SHORT-
TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT (2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/ 
content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf. 
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the opposite direction: institutional shareholders in particular are holding 
shares for shorter periods of time.215  More transient shareholders have 
greater incentives to agitate for short-term profits, even if the strategies 
employed to achieve such profits have the potential to destabilize the 
firm, and thus risk conversion/dilution, in the long run.216 
One might expect longer-term shareholders to have greater 
incentives to avoid conversion/dilution, but shareholder apathy has been 
well documented.217  Bank shareholders often have a highly diversified 
pool of investments, and as such they may not be willing to invest their 
time in policing the management of one individual bank.218  While it is 
true that apathetic long-term shareholders are less likely than transient 
shareholders to actively push for increased leverage, bank managers also 
have incentives to increase leverage,219 and apathetic bank shareholders 
do little to check management behavior.  Even where shareholder will is 
present, many shareholders lack the ability to assess notoriously 
complex and opaque bank balance sheets: it may be unreasonable to 
expect these shareholders to understand enough of the bank’s risk 
profile to influence and discipline management. 220  This is a fortiori the 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 296–97 (2012). 
 216. Id. at 302–04. 
 217. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 213, at 792.  Kaal also notes that cocos could create 
a false sense of security, thus dissuading monitoring efforts: “If the market in 
contingent capital securities should evolve with CCS designs that provide sufficient 
protections and guard against systemic risks and contagion, it seems theoretically 
possible that decision makers could rely on the design of CCS and neglect their role as 
monitors.” Kaal, supra note 184, at 310. 
 218. Fleischer, supra note 14, at 9.  An additional argument has been made that 
there are few incentives for existing bank shareholders to agitate for the bank to be less 
leveraged, because by making the remaining debt safer, a reduction in leverage results 
in a transfer of value from the shareholders to the debt holders. Admati et al., supra 
note 84, at 41. 
 219. “If the corporation were financed mostly with equity, such executives would 
share in the upside if things go well, but they would also share in the downside if things 
go badly. If the corporation is financed mostly with debt, on the other hand, the 
managers’ upside potential is amplified, and their downside risk remains limited.” 
Fleischer, supra note 14, at 8. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, 
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010). 
 220. “Evaluation of the creditworthiness of any bank requires analyses of its balance 
sheet, operations, management, competitors, and so on.  Information on each of these 
elements is at best only partly disclosed to bank investors, and even in the absence of 
moral hazard problems, creditworthiness can vary over time from changes in ordinary 
business operations.” Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking 
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case when the risks that need to be disciplined are “tail” risks that will 
only really come to light in financial crises, and which, by definition, are 
hard to predict.221 
Expecting bank shareholders to impose discipline on bank 
management in ordinary times thus seems aspirational at best, even if 
the shareholders are distantly threatened by dilution of their 
shareholdings upon a coco conversion.  However, as a crisis brews and 
coco conversion suddenly seems likely, shareholder apathy is likely to 
evaporate, and shareholders are likely to become much more motivated 
to sell their shares in the bank.222  The difficulties inherent in accurately 
assessing the bank’s risk profile persist, though, and may even deepen in 
a crisis. 223  As such, this type of selling is not really informed market 
discipline: instead, it is more of a panic, a reflection of herd behavior 
and rumors about the distress of the issuing bank,224 as well as a desire 
to get an “early-mover advantage” by selling stock before other 
shareholders do so.225  Widespread panicked sales by shareholders will 
depress the issuer’s stock price, potentially below any price that is a 
rational reflection of the risk profile of the issuer. Facing this kind of 
downward pressure on its stock price, the issuing bank may be 
incentivized to attempt to improve its risk profile by sharply restricting 
lending and selling its assets in a fire sale:226 indirectly, then, cocos have 
                                                                                                                 
System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 275 (2010).  A recent survey by 
Barclays found that a majority of bank investors either do not understand or trust the 
risk-weights assigned to such bank’s assets. Haldane & Madouros, supra note 16, at 21. 
 221. See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.  Acharya et al. are skeptical of 
the ability of cocos to address tail risks:  
[B]anks can – as they have in the past – take bets on the tail risk of the economy . . . .  
A property of taking on such tail risk is that the only outcomes possible are boom or 
bust, and the intermediate region of risk outcomes over which contingent capital 
might have some bite is essentially rendered rather unlikely or inconsequential.  Such 
tail-risk seeking would likely have to be addressed through means other than pure 
reliance on a contingent capital requirement.  
Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 166. 
 222. Allen, supra note 36, at 159. 
 223. Market discipline is likely to be particularly confused in a time of crisis. M. 
Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Paying Bank Examiners for Performance, 35 REG. 
32, 36 (2012). 
 224. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 100, at 55–56. 
 225. Brunnermeier, supra note 71, at 96. 
 226. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 20.  At this stage, 
equity markets are likely to be inaccessible for the bank, so a fresh recapitalization will 
not be an option. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 15. 
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incentivized socially harmful deleveraging behaviors that are the very 
externalities that regulatory capital requirements were created to 
avoid.227 
In sum, shareholder discipline of coco issuers is likely to be largely 
ineffective during normal times, but potentially destructive during 
crises.  As such, the threat of dilution posed by cocos is unlikely to 
prompt any meaningful, socially beneficial improvement in shareholder 
governance of banks.  The next Part will consider whether the creation 
of a new class of interests, cocoholders, will inspire any better 
governance. 
ii. Cocoholder Discipline 
At least prior to conversion, cocos are more debt-like than equity-
like.  The generally accepted view is that debtholders are superior to 
shareholders in terms of the discipline they exert on bank 
management:228 extrapolating from this, prior to conversion, cocoholders 
should theoretically be more effective than shareholders in exerting 
discipline over bank management.  However, many of the factors that 
impede shareholder governance of banks are also at work with respect to 
debtholders: the opacity of banks’ operations, risk and balance sheet 
deters governance,229 as does the apathy inherent in any investor that 
holds a large group of diversified investments.230  Furthermore, there is 
an increasing trend towards the decoupling of debtholders’ contractual 
rights from exposure to the debt issuer (for example, by purchasing a 
CDS that will make them whole in the event the debt issuer fails), which 
“weakens their incentives to assess and monitor debtors’ repayment 
ability.”231  The experience of the financial crisis supports skepticism 
about debtholder governance living up to its theoretical promise; at least 
for banks, there seems to have been little by way of discipline from 
debtholders in the boom years leading up to the financial crisis.232 
                                                                                                                 
 227. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 228. FRENCH ET AL., supra note 103, at 44. 
 229. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 28. 
 230. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 231. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: 
Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 665 (2008). 
 232. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 34–35. 
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While the fear of conversion may render cocoholders somewhat 
more motivated than ordinary debtholders to discipline management,233 
cocoholders are likely to underestimate the risk of conversion (which 
will only occur in low-probability, high-consequence tail events),234 and 
thus it is unlikely that cocoholders will exert pressure upon management 
until a tail event seems imminent.235  At this late stage, it is likely that 
pressure from the cocoholders will take the form of panicked sales of 
cocos and shorting of the coco issuer, rather than measured and 
informed discipline.236  If the cocos have a market-based trigger and 
market activity causes the issuing bank’s share price to fall low enough 
(or conversely, CDS spread to rise high enough), then this will trigger 
conversion.237  Even if changes in stock prices or CDS spreads do not 
immediately reach the levels necessary for conversion (or if the cocos 
have regulator- or capital-based triggers instead of market-based 
triggers), these changes will be interpreted by other financial institutions 
as red flags, damaging confidence in the issuing bank.  If market 
participants lack confidence in the issuing bank, they may withdraw or 
restrict such bank’s access to short-term funding (such as that provided 
through the repurchase agreement market),238 and without such funding, 
a bank’s decline is likely to be precipitous.239  Even if a bank could 
survive the beginning of such a liquidity run, that run would inspire 
further drops in the bank’s stock prices, and corresponding increases in 
its CDS spreads.240  This could set off market-based triggers, or the loss 
                                                                                                                 
 233. The BCBS notes that, depending on how conversion is structured, 
“[c]ontingent capital holders may have an extra incentive to monitor the risks taken by 
the issuing bank due to the potential loss of principal associated with the conversion.” 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 18. 
 234. Allen, supra note 36, at 135–36, 157. 
 235. Id. at 157–58. 
 236. Id. at 158.  It is also important to note that sales and shorting by cocoholders 
will not occur in a vacuum – shareholders in the bank and speculators will also engage 
in sales and shorting activity. Id. at 159–60. 
 237. This scenario has been referred to as a “death spiral”, whereby “the dilution of 
the existing stockholders’ claims that would occur in a conversion lowers the stock 
price, which leads to more dilution, which lowers the price even further.” FRENCH ET 
AL., supra note 103, at 56. 
 238. Allen, supra note 36, at 155–56. 
 239. If a financial institution does not have a sufficiently large and liquid capital 
cushion, a run on its short-term funding sources can render it insolvent and illiquid 
almost overnight. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 326. 
 240. Allen, supra note 36, at 162. 
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of liquidity could force the regulator to exercise any power it has to 
declare a trigger event, thereby bringing about conversion.241 
If conversion of the cocos does occur, one can argue that the cocos 
have implicitly failed to achieve their governance objectives: the specter 
of conversion should have encouraged sufficiently prudent management 
such that the cocos would never have converted.242  Nonetheless, Coffee 
and Kaal and Henkel have proposed models for cocos that are structured 
to give governance a second chance, by creating new voting blocs post-
conversion.  Kaal and Henkel propose that cocos should be structured 
with two sequential triggers:243 assuming that both triggers are tripped, 
Kaal and Henkel’s proposal would create a post-conversion voting bloc 
of shareholders with supermajority voting powers.244  Coffee’s proposal 
would create a new voting bloc of preferred shareholders with interests 
aligned with debt holders, rather than common shareholders.245  Both of 
these newly-created voting blocs would be very motivated to press for 
more prudent management.246  However, motivation counts for little if 
the newly-created voting constituencies don’t have enough time to 
pressure the management of the issuing bank to recapitalize, and 
management doesn’t have enough time to respond: 247  because coco 
conversion will only occur following a tail-event (and most likely 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Because capital ratios are a lagging indicator of a bank’s health, cocos with a 
capital-based trigger would probably not convert before the liquidity crisis brings down 
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increase the voting rights of the former cocoholders (now equity holders). Kaal & 
Henkel, supra note 27, at 230–31. 
 244. Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 231. 
 245. Coffee, supra note 177, at 806. 
 246. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 27. 
 247. “If the new preferred shareholders are to be given voting rights in the hope that 
this will alter corporate governance at the issuer and/or affect managerial preferences, 
such an issuance cannot come at the twelfth hour if it is to work.” Coffee, supra note 
177, at 831. 
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amidst a liquidity crisis), bank failure—or the need for government 
intervention—is likely to follow hard upon conversion.248 
In a bid to address timing constraints, Coffee makes a novel 
proposal for incremental conversion of cocos, which would allow for 
earlier triggering and thus more time for discipline.249  Instead of waiting 
for a tail event to occur, Coffee’s proposal would allow for partial 
conversion of cocos even if there has been only a moderate stock price 
decline.  While Coffee concedes that it would be extreme for all cocos 
to convert because of  “a moderate stock price decline (which might 
occur for extrinsic reasons and later be reversed),”250 Coffee suggests 
that perhaps 25% of the cocos could convert upon a 25% drop in stock 
price (as measured from the stock price at the date of issuance).251  
Thereafter, a further 25% of cocos would convert upon a further 25% 
drop in stock price, and so on.252  However, the marketability of cocos 
structured in such a way is questionable: if even a partial conversion 
were to occur after only a moderate drop in stock price, investors would 
likely require a prohibitive spread on cocos ex ante to compensate them 
for the risk of premature conversion (what the IMF terms “false 
positives”).253 
Assuming, however, that cocos structured as per Coffee’s proposal 
would be marketable, it is worth putting the potential efficacy of these 
cocos to an (admittedly unscientific) test, by superimposing this 
hypothetical incremental conversion structure on the actual decline of 
Bear Stearns.  If we hypothesize that Bear Stearns had issued cocos at its 
actual record high stock price of $171.51 (hit on January 12, 2007),254 
we see that no conversion would have occurred until the stock price fell 
below $128.63 (being 75% of $171.51), which occurred on July 26, 
2007. 255   On March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns had to be rescued by 
JPMorgan (with the backing of the United States government); 256 
                                                                                                                 
 248. Allen, supra note 36, at 128. 
 249. Coffee, supra note 177, at 807, 834–35. 
 250. Id. at 830. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., supra note 175, at 24. 
 254. Daniel Burns, 12 Key Dates in the Demise of Bear Stearns, REUTERS, Mar. 17, 
2008, http://blogs.reuters.com/from-reuterscom/2008/03/17/12-key-dates-in-the-demise 
-of-bear-stearns/. 
 255. Company Report of Bear Stearns Cos., BLOOMBERG LAW (on file with author). 
 256. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 290. 
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Coffee’s proposal would therefore have allowed seven-and-a-half 
months for a new post-conversion voting block to pressure Bear Stearns’ 
management to recapitalize, and for management to respond.  This 
seven-and-a-half month timeframe is a “best case scenario,” given that it 
discounts the very real likelihood that conversion of Bear Stearns’ 
hypothetical cocos would have inspired a liquidity crisis that increased 
the pace of Bear Stearns’ decline,257 but even this best case scenario 
might not have provided enough time for recapitalization.  For example, 
Lehman Brothers’ first real financing problems surfaced in March of 
2008,258  and from that time onwards Lehman faced significant pressure 
from regulators and markets to raise capital and otherwise deleverage.  It 
did manage to make significant strides in improving its capital and 
liquidity positions,259 but unfortunately it was unable to improve enough 
to earn the confidence of the financial markets, and Lehman was forced 
to file for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.260  Six months therefore 
proved to be an insufficient period of time to restructure Lehman’s risk 
profile, so seven and a half months may similarly have been insufficient 
time for Bear Stearns to undergo its own risk profile restructuring (and if 
Bear Stearns had issued cocos when its stock was trading lower than its 
record high price of $171.51, conversion would have come later and left 
even less time for recapitalization). 
Looking at the examples of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, it 
seems questionable whether even a staggered, early trigger system for 
coco conversion would allow time for converted cocoholders to have a 
meaningful impact on the governance of banks (it is also questionable 
whether there would be any market for cocos with this type of staggered 
trigger).  It therefore seems that any voting bloc created post-conversion 
is likely to be ineffectual in saving an ailing bank, and if the governance 
benefits of cocos are illusory, cocos have little by way of redeeming 
features other than their cheaper cost for banks.261   The BCBS and 
national governments should reject cocos, and other hybrid instruments, 
and require all regulatory capital to be comprised of Common Equity 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See supra notes 185–91 and accompanying text. 
 258. Lehman’s share price was relatively solid towards the end of 2007, but started 
to fall quite dramatically after the Bear Stearns acquisition was announced in March of 
2008.  After a brief improvement in April, it continued its downward slide through the 
summer of 2008. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 325–26. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 339. 
 261. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 53. 
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Tier 1.262  To subdue bank resistance to this approach, the next Part 
considers ways of neutralizing banks’ incentives to fund themselves 
with hybrid instruments and to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements 
more broadly. 
III. FIXING TAX INCENTIVES 
A. TAX BIASES AGAINST EQUITY 
Tax codes subsidize corporate debt when they make interest 
payments on debt tax-deductible for a corporation, while equity returns 
(e.g., dividends paid on common shares) are not.263  Because most tax 
codes make interest expense tax-deductible at the corporate level, the 
only tax paid on interest is the tax paid by the holder of the debt (e.g., 
the bondholder).  Dividends, being the equivalent return on equity, 
however, are taxed at the level of both the corporation and the equity 
holder (e.g., the shareholder). 264   While tax codes are by no means 
uniform as between different countries, a tax structure that favors debt 
over equity to at least some degree is standard in most countries.265  This 
tax preference in favor of debt is not an inevitability, however, but rather 
a policy choice resting on an arbitrary foundation.266 
                                                                                                                 
 262. Although some might fear that an increase in common equity holdings will 
circumscribe the ability of banks to extend credit, this fear is unfounded: as long as 
banks’ total level of funding remains constant, they can continue to make the same 
amount of credit available (i.e., as far as banks’ ability to lend goes, the debt-equity 
composition of this funding pool is irrelevant – they can issue more equity to allow 
them to lend more). Admati et al., supra note 18, at 43.  Hanson et al. did not find 
sufficient empirical evidence to support any correlation between equity ratios and loan 
rates. Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 18. 
 263. Edgar, supra note 105, at 998–99; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 
11, at 5.  The reasons for the different tax treatment of debt and equity are largely 
historical: they were “originally developed to address the problem of controlling 
shareholders financing their privately held corporations through debt to avoid higher 
taxes on dividends.” Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1246. 
 264. Daniel Shaviro, The 2008 Financial Crisis: Implications for Tax Reform 4–5 
(NYU Center for Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 09-35, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442089. 
 265. Edgar, supra note 105, at 998–1000.  The IMF also refers to the “almost 
ubiquitous practice of allowing interest payments, but not the cost of equity finance, as 
a deduction against CIT.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 5. 
 266. The reasons for the different tax treatment of debt and equity are largely 
historical: they were “originally developed to address the problem of controlling 
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When a corporation can deduct interest payments on its debt, the 
managers of that corporation are incentivized to continue to fund the 
corporation with debt, rather than equity, up to the point where the 
internalized costs of corporate instability resulting from leverage 
outweigh the benefits associated with the cheaper funding (or the point 
where debt funding ceases to be a cheaper option, because the 
corporation is charged a higher interest rate due to its perceived 
riskiness).267  In the context of banks, this equilibrium is likely to be 
reached only after significant amounts of leverage have been incurred, 
as many of the costs of instability can be externalized to society at 
large.268  In particular, where the bank in question is perceived as “too 
big to fail” and therefore implicitly supported by a government safety 
net, debt costs will not increase in a way that truly reflects the risk 
associated with increased reliance on debt funding, so there is little 
incentive to restrain leverage. 269   Accordingly, regulatory capital 
requirements have been put in place with respect to banks, forcing them 
to fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1 and thus limit 
their leverage. 270   But there remains an underlying tension between 
regulatory capital requirements, which require banks to rely on equity 
funding, and tax incentives, which discourage banks from funding 
themselves with equity.  If we can neutralize the tax incentives that 
encourage banks to favor debt, then that should be sufficient to stop 
banks from seeking to arbitrage the numerator of the regulatory capital 
equation by developing new and complicated debt-equity hybrids.271  
Addressing tax incentives for debt, if done carefully, can also 
significantly lessen incentives to arbitrage the assessment of a bank’s 
“risk-weighted assets” (the denominator of the regulatory capital 
                                                                                                                 
shareholders financing their privately held corporations through debt to avoid higher 
taxes on dividends.” Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1246. See also Fatica et al., supra note 
120, at 6. 
 267. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1001. 
 268.  
[W]hen firms borrow, they are likely to internalize the expected bankruptcy costs they 
themselves incur but not the impact of their own failure and default on others (effects 
that are not present in the use of equity finance).  These externalities are likely to be 
especially large for financial institutions, given their systemic importance. 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 12. See also Edgar, supra note 105, at 1001. 
 269. Admati et al., supra note 84, at i. 
 270. See supra Part I.A.  
 271. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
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equation) by way of accounting manipulation and favorable risk 
modeling.272 
B. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
This Part considers proposals that have been made in tax literature 
to address corporate debt bias generally, and it narrows the application 
of those proposals to banks and their regulatory capital. 273   First, 
however, some caveats: one might argue that, at least with respect to 
banks that are the beneficiaries of “too big to fail” implicit subsidies, it 
is insufficient to neutralize tax incentives for debt, and tax incentives 
should go so far as to favor equity over debt.274  In addition, a number of 
Pigouvian tax-based solutions have been proposed to address the 
externalities imposed on society by the activities of large, interconnected 
financial institutions, including taxes on the activities, transactions, and 
profits of such institutions, as well as the bonuses they pay.275  This 
Article does not consider any of these proposals in any depth.  In 
addition, this Article does not attempt to fix corporate debt bias 
generally, nor does it advocate for an overhaul of the broader tax 
system: the fiscal costs of making all corporate equity tax-deductible 
would be far in excess of what is proposed by this Article.  Instead, this 
Article has the limited goal of minimizing bank incentives to arbitrage 
                                                                                                                 
 272. It should be noted that this type of arbitrage does not entail the same sunk costs 
as developing and marketing new hybrid products, and so persistent government 
subsidies for debt will always encourage banks to understate their risk-weighted assets 
to some degree, even if the tax incentives are addressed. 
 273. Fleischer also advocates reform of debt bias that is targeted only at financial 
institutions.  He argues that this is justified on the grounds that financial institutions 
“are the source of most of the externalized social costs of excessive leverage.” 
Fleischer, supra note 14, at 11. 
 274. See, e.g., Edgar, supra note 105, at 998.  There is by no means universal 
support for this type of policy – it has been rejected outright by the IMF: “Some would 
argue, for example, that non-tax factors create an inherent tendency toward excessive 
leverage and that the tax system ought therefore to actively disfavor debt.  But there is 
no consensus on the precise nature and magnitude of such inefficiencies, or on the 
relative merits of tax and regulatory responses in addressing them.  Neutrality of tax 
arrangements remains a core benchmark for policy evaluation and design in this as in 
other areas of tax design, and provides useful organizing framework for the discussion.” 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 4. 
 275. Shackelford et al., supra note 9, at 796. 
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regulatory capital requirements. 276   Finally, this Article does not 
consider how to design a transition from the current regime: 277  this 
remains a project for future research.  Having now established the scope 
of the endeavor, we turn to the tax literature on corporate debt bias. 
Although national tax codes differ around the world, they share 
some similarities.  One such similarity is that, generally, the return on 
equity is taxed twice, at the corporate and the investor level, whereas 
interest on debt is only taxed at the investor level.278  This creates a 
pervading tax bias towards debt.  Broadly speaking, there are two ways 
to help neutralize this bias.  One is to make debt less attractive; the 
alternative is to make equity more attractive.279  Most obviously, debt 
could be made less attractive by abolishing corporate deductions for 
interest (i.e., taxing debt at both the corporate and the investor level),280 
but the tax literature also suggests several more nuanced methods of 
neutralizing bias toward debt.  One such method is the implementation 
of a comprehensive business income tax (“CBIT”) that eliminates the 
deductibility of debt at the corporate level, but provides for no taxation 
of either debt or equity at the investor level.281  Another such proposal is 
for the introduction of “thin capitalization” rules, whereby progressive 
limits are put on the amount of interest that can be deducted by 
corporations in certain circumstances.282  In the banking context, several 
authors have suggested reducing the availability of interest deductibility 
                                                                                                                 
 276. Fundamental change in tax structures may provoke instability and financial 
distress. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 16.  However, the hope is that the 
introduction of the more limited reform proposed in this Article would not prove 
destabilizing. 
 277. “Gaps between announcement and implementation (or even the expectation of 
tax changes) can distort financial decisions.” Id. at 32.  For example, if a nation agreed 
to implement an ACET1, the banks there might be reluctant to raise capital in the 
interim period between the announcement and the implementation of the policy.  A 
transitional plan should be formulated to minimize undercapitalization during such 
interim period. 
 278. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 7.  In the United States, the relevant provisions are 
26 I.R.C. §§ 163, 311(a) (2006). 
 279. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 13–14; RUUD A. DE MOOIJ, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, TAX BIASES TO DEBT FINANCE: ASSESSING THE PROBLEM, FINDING 
SOLUTIONS 14 (2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/ 
sdn1111.pdf. 
 280. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1003. 
 281. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 264, at 8; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, 
at 13; DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 15. 
 282. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 11; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 13; 
DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 14. 
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as a bank’s leverage increases:283 for example, Fleischer has suggested 
the “elimin[ation of] the deduction of interest by financial institutions to 
the extent the debt/equity ratio of the institution exceeds 2 to 1.”284 
The alternative to penalizing debt is to seek to neutralize debt bias 
by incentivizing equity: proposals of this type can be targeted at either 
the corporate or the shareholder level.  For example, a dividend 
exemption scheme exempts shareholders from paying tax on dividends 
while the corporation continues to be liable for taxes on its equity.285  
However, this does not respond completely to existing debt bias (which 
exempts debt at the corporate level, rather than at the investor level), so 
a dividend imputation scheme might be more appropriate—this would 
give shareholders a credit for tax paid on equity at the corporate level so 
that equity is effectively taxed at the shareholder level, matching debt 
taxation.286 Alternatively, an Allowance for Corporate Equity (“ACE”) 
allows for a deduction on equity at the corporate level that approximates 
corporate deductibility of interest.287 
The following (highly stylized) examples illustrate the differences 
between these proposals. 288   Assume that in Country X, corporate 
income (including income that is distributed to shareholders by means of 
dividends) is taxable at a rate of 20%, but interest payments made to 
service corporate debt are tax deductible.  Individual investors’ income 
is taxed at a rate of 30%, notwithstanding the source of that income.  
The following scenarios show how tax reform would impact Company 
C and Investor I, who are resident in Country X. 
 
Scenario 1: Abolishing Corporate Deductions for Interest 
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%: it is 
irrelevant whether that income is contributed to shareholders as 
                                                                                                                 
 283. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 264, at 11; Fleischer, supra note 14, at 4. 
 284. Fleischer, supra note 14, at 4.  Fleischer further notes, “[t]he goal of such a tax 
is not to punish banks, but rather to remove the tax incentive to increase leverage 
beyond the ratio that would arise in a world without taxes.” Id. at 4. 
 285. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 264, at 7. 
 286. See, e.g., id. at 7–8. 
 287. See, e.g., id. at 9; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 14; DE MOOIJ, 
supra note 279, at 16–19. 
 288. These examples are highly simplified, ignoring that many countries have 
progressive tax rates and treat investor income differently depending on its source.  The 
examples also ignore that if reform were implemented, rates would most likely be 
adjusted as part of the reform to neutralize the revenue impact of the change. 
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dividends or used to service debt obligations.  Investor I would pay 30% 
on all income: it is irrelevant whether that income derives from an 
investment in equity or debt. 
 
Scenario 2: Introduction of CBIT 
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%: it is 
irrelevant whether that income is contributed to shareholders as 
dividends or used to service debt obligations.  Investor I would not pay 
any tax on income from its investments in equity or debt. 
 
Scenario 3: Introduction of Thin Capitalization Rules 
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%.  To the 
extent that Company C maintained a ratio of debt to equity below a 
certain level, income used to service debt obligations would be tax 
deductible.  Once the ratio of Company C’s debt to equity exceeded the 
stipulated level, this tax deductibility would be progressively eliminated.  
Investor I would pay 30% on all income: it is irrelevant whether that 
income derives from an investment in equity or debt. 
 
Scenario 4: Introduction of Dividend Exemption Scheme 
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%, but 
income used to service debt obligations would be tax deductible.  
Investor I would not pay any tax on income from its investments in 
equity, but would pay 30% on income from their investments in debt. 
 
Scenario 5: Introduction of Dividend Imputation Scheme 
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%, but 
income used to service debt obligations would be tax deductible.  
Investor I would receive a credit for the tax already paid by Company C, 
and so would pay only 10% on income from its investments in equity.  
Investor I would continue to pay 30% on income from their investments 
in debt. 
 
Scenario 6: Introduction of ACE 
Company C’s income would be tax deductible if it is either used to 
service debt obligations or contributed to shareholders as dividends.  
Investor I would pay 30% on income from its investments in both equity 
and debt. 
 
The remainder of this Part will consider the desirability and 
feasibility of narrowly applying the foregoing proposals for the targeted 
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purpose of addressing banks’ incentives to arbitrage regulatory capital 
requirements. 
The simplest way to discourage banks from using hybrid 
instruments to satisfy regulatory capital requirements would be to end 
tax-deductibility for such hybrids, effectively saying that all regulatory 
capital must be taxed at the same rate as Common Equity Tier 1.  
However, even assuming that the political difficulties inherent in 
effecting such a change could be overcome,289 this would raise the cost 
of regulatory capital for banks and thus intensify the already strong 
incentives that banks have to understate their risk-weighted assets (the 
denominator of the regulatory capital ratio) in order to hold less 
capital.290  The same concerns arise in the context of thin capitalization 
rules: assume, for example, that a rule was introduced that provided that 
the tax-deductibility of a bank’s hybrid instruments would be 
progressively eliminated as the ratio of the bank’s hybrid instruments to 
Common Equity Tier 1 increased.  This would succeed in making 
hybrids less attractive to banks, but it would also make regulatory 
capital more expensive.  This type of thin capitalization rule would thus 
exacerbate incentives to arbitrage the calculation of risk-weighted 
assets, and the more complicated nature of progressive thin 
capitalization rules (as opposed to a more clear-cut abolition of tax-
deductibility for hybrids) would allow greater scope for exploitation.291 
The remaining proposals for neutralizing debt bias are less likely to 
encourage banks to underreport their risk-weighted assets.  However, 
three of these (the CBIT, dividend imputation, and dividend exemption 
schemes) are non-starters because of the size and importance of tax-
exempt and foreign investors as a market for bank capital.292  Looking 
                                                                                                                 
 289. Eisenger colorfully describes the resistance that would accompany any attempt 
to abolish corporate debt deductibility generally, noting that “[r]educing the 
deductibility would be elegant but generate screams of bloody murder from corporate 
America.” Jesse Eisinger, Distortion in Tax Code Makes Debt More Attractive to 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/distortion-
in-tax-code-makes-debt-more-attractive-to-banks/?ref=business. 
 290. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 2. 
 291. Complicated tax rules allow greater scope for arbitrage activity. See Fleischer, 
supra note 14, at 5. 
 292. The IMF has estimated that tax-exempt investors hold 40%, and non-residents 
hold 30% of all equity issued in the United Kingdom.  For the United States, the IMF 
suggests that approximately 50% of equities are held by tax-exempt investors. INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 8. 
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first at the CBIT, we could tailor this for regulatory capital purposes by 
charging banks a tax on any hybrid instrument used to satisfy regulatory 
capital requirements: the rate of taxation would be equal to the amount 
the bank is charged on its Common Equity Tier 1.  Then, because CBIT 
requires no tax payment at the investor level,293 tax credits would need 
to be given at the investor level for the compensatory tax paid by the 
bank on its hybrid instruments, as well as the tax paid by the bank on its 
Common Equity Tier 1.  However, tax-exempt and foreign investors 
would not be able to take advantage of these investor-level tax credits, 
and so a CBIT scheme would give them no greater incentive to invest in 
Common Equity Tier 1.  Furthermore, these investors would start to 
charge more for hybrid capital; while they would continue to pay no tax 
themselves, they would be forced to absorb corporate-level tax on 
hybrids for the first time.294  Thus, as far as tax-exempt and foreign 
investors are concerned, there would be no difference between a CBIT 
scheme like this, and a scheme that merely ended tax-deductibility of 
hybrid instruments. 
If we were to design a dividend imputation scheme for Common 
Equity Tier 1, then both the bank and its shareholders would still pay 
taxes on the capital, but shareholders would be given a credit for the tax 
already paid by the bank.295  If all bank shareholders were in a position 
to take advantage of these tax credits, then the scheme would ensure that 
equity would only be taxed at the rate that applies to investors, just as 
with hybrid instruments.296  However, tax-exempt and foreign investors 
cannot use these tax credits, and so they would still absorb corporate-
level tax on Common Equity Tier 1 while not being required to bear any 
corporate-level tax on hybrids: the tax bias would persist for these 
investors.297 
                                                                                                                 
 293. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 8; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 13; DE 
MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 15. 
 294. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1003. 
 295. The purpose of structuring the dividend imputation scheme in this way is to 
ensure the total tax collected on equity approximates what would have been collected if 
only the shareholder had been taxed.  Shaviro gives a helpful example that illustrates 
how a dividend imputation scheme works: “[S]uppose the corporate rate was 25 
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75 dividend (€ 100 with the gross-up).  For tax purposes, the shareholder would have € 
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Shaviro, supra note 264, at 7. 
 296. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1004. 
 297. Id. at 1005, 1010–11. 
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Finally, a dividend exemption scheme would render return on 
Common Equity Tier 1 taxable at the bank level but not at the investor 
level, whereas the return on hybrids would be the opposite: taxable at 
the investor level but not at the bank level.  While exempting dividends 
from tax would be attractive for local investors, tax-exempt and foreign 
investors never paid any tax on dividends in the first place.  A dividend 
exemption scheme would therefore not mark any change from the status 
quo for these investors: just as before, no corporate-level tax would be 
factored into the interest payments that these investors receive, but 
corporate-level tax would be factored into dividend payments. 298  
Therefore, all other things being equal, tax-exempt and foreign investors 
would still charge less for hybrids than for Common Equity Tier 1. 
In sum, to the extent that banks are raising capital from the large 
and important tax-exempt and foreign investor bloc, no CBIT, dividend 
imputation, or dividend exemption scheme would reorient existing bank 
incentives to satisfy regulatory capital requirements with hybrid 
instruments.  The efficacy of an Allowance for Common Equity Tier 1, 
or “ACET1,” however, is not undermined by the prominence of tax-
exempt or foreign investors in the capital markets.  An ACET1 would 
allow for a bank-level deduction on Common Equity Tier 1 expense,299 
which would lower the bank’s cost of equity; this lower cost would then 
be passed on to all investors (including tax-exempt and foreign 
investors), rendering Common Equity Tier 1 a much more attractive 
funding source for banks.  Furthermore, because the ACET1 ensures 
that Common Equity Tier 1 and debt funding are taxed in the same way, 
it reduces incentives for banks to understate their risk-weighted assets 
and deliberately hold insufficient capital. 
As such, the ACET1 is a relatively simple and elegant alternative to 
accommodating hybrids within the regulatory capital framework.  
However, the introduction of this ACET1 does not obviate the need for 
regulatory capital requirements: the persistence of government subsidies 
for debt still provides some incentive for banks to be overly-
                                                                                                                 
 298.  
Tax-exempt investors—pension funds, charitable foundations and, in many cases, 
sovereign wealth funds—clearly prefer debt finance: for them indeed there is a clear 
arbitrage gain in lending to tax-paying corporations and taking the interest untaxed. In 
addition, for non-resident investors, not liable to domestic personal taxes, the 
deductibility of debt finance is critical. 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 8. 
 299. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 9; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 14. 
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leveraged, 300  and these incentives still need to be addressed by 
regulation.  Furthermore, even with the best incentives in place, banks 
suffering from distress may not be able to maintain sufficient Common 
Equity Tier 1.  In this context, regulatory capital requirements serve as a 
supervisory tool; a bank’s inability to comply with capital regulations 
sends a warning signal to regulators about the bank’s health.301  The 
following Part therefore explores in more detail how the ACET1 can be 
accommodated within the regulatory capital framework. 
IV. AN ALLOWANCE FOR COMMON EQUITY REGULATORY CAPITAL 
An ACE has already been implemented more broadly (i.e., for all 
corporate equity) in several countries, including Belgium. 302   The 
Belgian ACE model serves as a useful starting point for formulating the 
more limited ACET1 (which would only be available to banks).  
Belgium allows for a deduction to the value of equity, and this 
allowance “applies to the book value of net equity and is corrected for 
the net value of equity participations.”303  Because an ACET1 structured 
in this way would allow for a deduction for retained earnings (as well as 
dividends paid), it would match tax provisions that allow deductions for 
debt payments as they accrue, even if they are not paid at that time.  It 
would therefore avoid any unintended consequence of encouraging 
banks to distribute their profits to shareholders, rather than build up 
cushions of retained earnings.  Furthermore, because the ACET1 would 
only be available on net equity less equity participations, banks would 
not be able to use the allowance twice on the same funds.304 
The Belgian model, like most proposals for an ACE, 305  only 
provides an allowance for the notional return on equity (as calculated by 
reference to some benchmark rate—Belgium uses “a notional deduction 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 301. This is the rationale for the United States’ “prompt corrective action” regime, 
codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006). 
 302. “Croatia implemented an ACE from 1994 to 2001, and it has recently been 
adopted in Belgium and Latvia. A variant is applied in Brazil, and partial ACEs were 
applied in Austria and Italy.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 14. 
 303. DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 17. 
 304. “If the parent would be granted an ACE on all equity, including that used to 
finance participations in related entities, it would receive an allowance for returns that 
are untaxed.” DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 17 n.18. 
 305. Id. at 16–17. 
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to the value of equity at the rate on 10-year government bonds”).306  In 
contrast, tax-deductibility is available with respect to all interest 
expenses (even when the rates of interest exceed market rates). 307  
Therefore, if an ACET1 were implemented, and it only allowed for the 
deduction of notional rates of return on that equity, debt bias would 
persist to the extent that a bank delivered a return on equity in excess of 
the notional return.308  In such situations, leverage would still be a more 
attractive way of funding bank investments, and increased leverage 
would likely drive up return on Common Equity Tier 1 (at least during 
good times),309 which would make an even higher portion of return on 
such equity not tax-deductible, making leverage seem even more 
attractive.  This vicious cycle would encourage banks to become highly-
leveraged, defeating the intention of an ACET1. 
It is conceivable, though, that an ACET1 could be applied to the 
full return on Common Equity Tier 1, thus fully neutralizing the tax bias 
for debt and against equity.310   The chief objection to designing an 
ACET1 in this way (and indeed, the main reservation associated with 
implementing ACEs in general, even when based on notional returns) is 
that doing so will result in a loss of revenue for the taxing authority.311  
Currently, taxing authorities receive taxation income levied on the full 
return on equity; if an ACET1 were applied to a notional return on 
                                                                                                                 
 306. Id. at 17. 
 307. Id. 
 308. This is the likely, rather than a purely theoretical, outcome.  For example, as of 
June 30, 2012, the yield on 10-year U.S. treasury bonds (the most obvious candidate for 
the “notional return” on equity for United States banks) was 1.67%. Resource Center: 
Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldYear 
&year=2012 (last visited June 16, 2013).  On June 30, 2012, the return on equity was 
9.99% for JPMorgan, 5.89% for Citigroup, and 12.98% for Wells Fargo. See JPMorgan 
Chase Return on Equity, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/JPM/return_on_ 
equity (last visited Aug. 5, 2013); Citigroup Return on Equity, YCHARTS, 
http://ycharts.com/companies/C/return_on_equity (last visited Aug. 5, 2013); Wells 
Fargo Return on Equity, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/WFC/return_on_ 
equity (last visited Aug. 5, 2013). 
 309. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 16. 
 310. Allowing banks to deduct the full return on all common equity held as 
regulatory capital goes beyond the IMF’s proposal, which is to “giv[e banks] a tax 
deduction for a notional return on Tier 1 capital.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 
11, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 311. DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 3. 
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banks’ Common Equity Tier 1, then taxing authorities would lose 
revenue in an amount equal to taxes that are currently levied on that 
notional return. 312   To fully neutralize debt bias by allowing banks 
complete deductibility of return on Common Equity Tier 1 would result 
in even greater losses in taxation revenue (although the revenue impact 
could potentially be offset by the introduction of some type of financial 
institution or transaction tax).313  While it might be expected that some 
of this revenue could be recouped at the investor level (i.e., investors 
receive dividends tax-free from banks, but must then pay tax on the 
dividends they receive), to the extent that shareholders are tax-exempt or 
are located in another jurisdiction, there will be no recoupment from 
investors of the foregone bank-level tax revenue.314  
In order to determine the feasibility of an ACET1 that allows 
complete deductibility of return on common equity regulatory capital, 
models would need to be run to determine what the actual impact of 
such a move would be on the GDP of each country.315  This is a project 
for future research, though one design issue to be tackled is whether the 
ACET1 should be available to banks only with respect to the minimum 
required holdings of Common Equity Tier 1, or whether it should be 
available for larger holdings as well.  The former option would certainly 
limit the revenue implications of implementing an ACET1 for banks, 
because it would ensure that only a limited slice of bank funding was 
exempt from taxation.  However, given that we want to encourage banks 
to fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1 than the minimum 
requirements dictate, it would be prudent (if economically feasible) to 
extend the ACET1 to a “buffer” of Common Equity Tier 1 beyond the 
minimum amount required.316  Thinking more broadly, calculations of 
                                                                                                                 
 312. The IMF has developed models to allow it to estimate the impact on GDP of 
the introduction of an ACE for the notional return on all common and preferred stock 
(the 10-year government bond yield in each country) for all corporations (i.e., not just 
banks). Id. at 20. The IMF estimates that this would likely result in a reduction in 
revenue of 0.43% of GDP in the United States, and 0.56% of GDP in the United 
Kingdom. Id. Complete deductibility of return on equity for all corporations would 
obviously have a larger impact on GDP.  However, the effect on GDP of an ACET1 is 
unknown at present. 
 313. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Edgar, supra note 105, at 1002–03. 
 315. If the proposed ACET1 is not economically feasible, it might still be worth 
investigating the benefits of allowing deductibility of a notional return on bank equity. 
 316. There are likely to be few detrimental consequences to society from banks 
funding themselves with more equity than originally intended. Admati et al., supra note 
84, at 33. 
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revenue impact should be based on the amount of Common Equity Tier 
1 currently required by Basel III, but it would also be worthwhile to run 
numbers to determine the impact of an ACET1 if banks were required to 
fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1 than Basel III 
currently requires. While this Article does not purport to make any 
comment about the quantitative aspects of Basel III, there are many 
economists who believe that in order to shore up the banking system, 
there needs to be a significant increase in the amount of Common Equity 
Tier 1 used by banks, above and beyond what is currently required by 
Basel III.317  If it is decided that regulatory capital requirements for 
banks should be increased, that increase could be introduced in 
conjunction with an ACET1 (again, if economically feasible), thus 
softening the impact of such increase on banks. 
The foregoing discussion is very high level and neglects many of 
the detailed design features that will need to be worked out before an 
ACET1 can be implemented, or even properly evaluated.  Economists 
and tax scholars will surely have much to contribute to this endeavor.  
From a regulatory scholarship perspective, we need to consider whether 
there is a sound policy basis for according special favorable tax 
treatment to banks, and whether consistent international implementation 
of such an ACET1 is feasible. 
A. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING AN ALLOWANCE FOR 
COMMON EQUITY REGULATORY CAPITAL 
The proposed ACET1 is a type of tax credit that will operate as a 
subsidy only for banks.  Such a subsidy is likely to meet with some 
popular resistance, given the current level of anti-bank sentiment around 
the world.318  However, because of collective action problems, it can be 
difficult for broad community disapproval to have any impact on the 
                                                                                                                 
 317. For example, Admati and nineteen other prominent economists have argued 
that banks should be required to fund themselves with common equity in an amount 
equal to at least 15% of their total assets. See Admati et al., supra note 11. 
 318. This sentiment is perhaps best epitomized by the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, which describes itself as “fighting back against the corrosive power of 
major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process, and the role of 
Wall Street in creating an economic collapse that has caused the greatest recession in 
generations.” About, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited 
June 16, 2013).  Despite the ubiquity and high visibility of the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, however, it has achieved little in terms of tangible results. 
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formulation of financial regulation, especially on an issue as complex as 
capital regulation.319   Instead, in the United States at least, it is the 
financial industry itself that has more input in the development of 
financial regulation.320  This means that financial regulation is an uphill 
battle,321 and some of the more drastic reforms that have been proposed 
to improve financial stability, such as breaking up the big banks, 
financial transaction taxes, and taxes on leverage, will likely face 
insurmountable industry opposition.322  The ACET1 proposed in this 
Article is unique among such reforms in that it seeks to improve 
financial stability by benefitting banks, and, as such, is a policy that is 
likely to be encouraged by the financial industry.323 
The proposed ACET1 is thus a politically expedient way to remove 
a key incentive for unhealthy levels of bank leverage.  An ACET1 is a 
defensible policy as well as politically expedient; it can be justified by 
the “specialness” of banks.  Banks are special because they are a key 
source of credit and thus fuel broader economic growth.324  In order to 
provide that credit, banks must often perform a maturity transformation 
role: the credit that banks usually provide is longer-term credit, whereas 
the funding they rely on to make the longer-term credit available is 
comprised of deposits and other short-term funding (like repurchase 
agreements) which can be withdrawn from the bank very quickly.325  
The inherent fragility, but social necessity, of this banking business 
                                                                                                                 
 319. For a discussion of the collective action problems associated with influencing 
financial regulatory policy, see Allen, supra note 14, at 26–29. 
 320. As Senator Dick Durbin put it, “the banks . . . are still the most powerful lobby 
on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place.” Ryan Grimm, Dick Durbin: Banks 
“Frankly Own the Place”, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2009, 6:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/dick-durbin-banks-frankly_n_193010.html. 
 321. In terms of capital regulation, Singer notes that “[h]istorically, financial 
institutions have generally resisted the imposition of capital regulation . . . .” SINGER, 
supra note 41, at 19. 
 322. For a discussion of resistance to the implementation of international financial 
taxes in the wake of the Financial Crisis, see Richard T. Page, Foolish Revenge or 
Shrewd Regulation: Financial-Industry Tax Law Reforms Proposed in the Wake of the 
Financial Crisis, 85 TUL. L. REV. 191, 207 (2010). 
 323. In a similar vein, Jesse Eisenger notes that “[m]aking dividend payments tax 
deductible, which would start to level the playing field, might be easier and more 
popular.” Eisenger, supra note 289. 
 324. See generally FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ARE BANKS SPECIAL? 
(1982), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm. 
 325. See id. 
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model can be invoked to support a special tax subsidy for Common 
Equity Tier 1 that will stabilize banks.326  
Special treatment for banks is nothing new, in any event.  Banks in 
the United States have had recourse to the Federal Reserve as “lender of 
last resort” since 1913,327 and since 1933, banks have had their deposit 
liabilities insured by the FDIC.328  Outside of the United States, some 
central banks have been performing “lender of last resort” roles for 
centuries, 329  and deposit insurance is now available to depositors in 
banks in over 100 countries.330  More recently, banks around the world 
perceived as “too big to fail” have received implicit subsidies from their 
home governments.331  Each of these types of special treatment, however, 
has a negative side effect in that it creates moral hazard: it encourages 
banks to engage in riskier behavior so as to multiply their profits in 
good times, knowing that there is a government safety net that will 
absorb the losses in bad times.332  Conversely, the ACET1 proposed in 
                                                                                                                 
 326. Because all banks perform this maturity transformation role, this ACET1 can 
justifiably be given to all banks, even those smaller banks that do not profit from 
implicit “too big to fail” government subsidies.  The ACET1 therefore might soothe 
some of the concerns of mid-tier and community banks, which are currently 
experiencing higher funding costs than those being charged to their “too big to fail” 
brethren, and feel disproportionately burdened by the provisions in Dodd-Frank, many 
of which were designed to address systemic stability issues that such banks feel they do 
not contribute to. See The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and 
Small Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of 
the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 116 (2011) (prepared statement of James D. 
MacPhee, Chairman, Independent Community Bankers of America). 
 327. The Federal Reserve System was established by the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).  Section 13 of that Act authorizes the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to act as a lender of last resort. 
 328. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was formed in 1933 with the 
enactment of the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 329. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 194, at 334–35 (noting that the Bank of 
England has been identified as the “lender of last resort” since the early 1800s). 
 330. Deposit Insurance Systems Worldwide, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
DEPOSIT INSURERS, http://www.iadi.org/di.aspx?id=67 (last visited June 16, 2013). 
 331. See supra notes 103, 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 332. Moral hazard is the “tendency of an insured to relax his efforts to prevent the 
occurrence of the risk that he has insured against because he has shifted the risk to an 
insurance company.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 
1998).  Lovett expressed the application of moral hazard in the banking context as 
follows: “If governments and modern nations do not allow most banks to [fail], how 
can the leaders and managements of banking institutions be disciplined and avoid 
unduly risky, negligent, or adventurous lending policies (or simply poor asset-liability 
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this Article promotes less risky behavior by neutralizing in large part the 
existing incentives for banks to minimize their equity funding. 
The ACET1 would, of course, be an expense for taxing authorities 
because it would reduce the revenue they would otherwise receive from 
taxing bank equity.  Such an expense must be considered, however, in 
the context of the cost of financial instability.  History has shown that 
tax revenues are likely to drop sharply in a recession (or depression) 
following a financial crisis, leading to an explosion of government 
debt.333  For example, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated 
that the United States incurred an additional $7 trillion in government 
debt as a direct result of the recession following the financial crisis.334  
Given the magnitude of the cost of instability, foregoing tax revenue 
from bank equity may well be an acceptable “premium” for improved 
stability (and if a future financial crisis were to occur nonetheless, the 
government would already have a reduced expectation of revenues from 
financial sector taxation, so the impact of such crisis on government 
debt would be somewhat dampened).  As an added benefit, to the extent 
that the ACET1 causes governments to be less dependent on tax 
revenues from banks in the first place, the political clout of banks may 
be somewhat weakened.  On the margins, there would also be some 
administrative savings associated with dispensing with hybrid 
instruments as regulatory capital: neither regulatory nor tax authorities 
would need to devote resources to evaluating new types of hybrid 
instruments to determine whether they should qualify as regulatory 
capital, or be entitled to debt tax treatment, respectively.335  Furthermore, 
to the extent that the ACET1 reduces incentives for banks to manipulate 
their accounting for risk-weighted assets, regulators will have an easier 
                                                                                                                 
management)?” William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based 
Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365, 1365 (1989). 
 333. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 142 (2009). 
 334. Simon Johnson, Where is the Volcker Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/where-is-the-volcker-rule/ 
?ref=business.  The economic contractions that follow a financial crisis often impose 
high costs on society in the form of reduced tax revenues. These costs are likely to 
dwarf the costs of any bailout in a financial crisis. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 
333, at 142, 224. 
 335. In addition, the social waste associated with private sector development of 
hybrid instruments to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements would be avoided: 
“Tens of millions of dollars a year in billable hours and investment banking fees are 
devoted to analyzing whether particular financial products will or should be treated as 
debt or equity for tax purposes.” Fleischer, supra note 14, at 10. 
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job monitoring banks’ compliance with regulatory capital 
requirements.336   
It should also be noted that several commentators have identified a 
significant flaw in the Basel architecture: namely, that regulatory capital 
requirements can be destabilizing to the extent that they encourage 
banks to invest heavily in asset classes that have been assigned low risk-
weightings.337   This practice simultaneously increases the number of 
such assets in the system and correlates bank exposure to them, and 
there is a very real concern that such growth/correlation will make the 
assets themselves more risky and the banking system as a whole more 
susceptible to bubbles and panics.338  However, the implementation of 
the proposed ACET1 will mitigate incentives for such destabilizing 
herding by banks: to the extent that the ACET1 lessens bank incentives 
to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements, banks will be less likely to 
concentrate their investments in low risk-weighted asset classes. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that traditional banks are not 
the only institutions that provide long-term credit funded by short-term 
liabilities.  The term “shadow banking” is often used to describe 
institutions (for example, money market mutual funds) that carry out 
similar functions as banks but are not subject to banking regulation.339  
While many have argued that the shadow banking sector poses great risk 
to financial stability,340 Basel III (and its predecessors Basel I and II) 
have never been applied to this shadow banking sector.  Indeed, the 
growth of the shadow banking industry was in many ways a response to 
                                                                                                                 
 336. The ACET1 addresses some of the concerns about regulatory capacity raised 
by Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 5. 
 337. This was the case with mortgage-backed securities issued prior to the Financial 
Crisis. See Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial 
Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture 20–22 (Yale Law & 
Econ., Research Paper No. 452, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127749; 
see also Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets 13 (ADBI Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 392,  2012), available at http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2012/10/29/ 
5292.dodd.frank.act.basel.iii.emerging.markets/. 
 338. Acharya, supra note 337, at 13. 
 339. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 220, at 261–62. 
 340. See generally id.; Eric F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal 
Origins (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1990816. 
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capital requirements for traditional banks:341 many investors migrated to 
institutions that were not subject to capital requirements, and therefore 
were perceived as able to offer investors more of a return.342  Because 
bank regulatory capital requirements do not apply to this shadow 
banking sector, the ACET1 proposed in this Article would not be 
available to shadow banks either.  This might have a salutary side-effect: 
the institution of the ACET1 would give traditional banks an edge over 
their less-regulated competitors, which might start to reverse the 
migration of funds to the shadow banking sector. 
B. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION 
The BCBS promulgated Basel I, its first international standards for 
regulating bank capital, in 1988.343  These standards were the response 
to a growing consensus that regulatory capital requirements were 
desirable but expensive, and that unilateral action by a country in setting 
minimum regulatory capital requirements would increase stability, but 
lead to a loss of competitiveness in attracting banking business. 344  
Individual countries were therefore reluctant to implement minimum 
capital standards for their banks unless they could be sure that other 
banks would be required to play by the same rules: international 
harmonization was a prerequisite to the implementation of stringent 
regulatory capital requirements.345  In contrast, because the proposed 
ACET1 would benefit banks rather than hinder them, national 
governments could move unilaterally in implementing such an ACET1.  
                                                                                                                 
 341. In 1981, the United States implemented regulatory capital requirements for 
banks for the first time, which incentivized some investors to exit the traditional 
banking industry. See id. at 274.  The rapid rise of the shadow banking industry began 
in the early 1980s, and shadow banking actually overtook the traditional banking sector 
in terms of market share mid-way through 2007. TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, THE SHADOW BANKING 
SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 1–2 (2009), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf. 
 342. “Where competition from unregulated entities is permitted, whether explicitly 
or de facto, capital and other requirements imposed on regulated firms may shrink 
margins enough to make them unattractive to investors. The result, as in the past, will 
be some combination of regulatory arbitrage, assumption of higher risk in permitted 
activities, and exit from the industry.” Gorton & Metrick, supra note 220, at 305. 
 343. BASEL I, supra note 8. 
 344. For a detailed discussion of incentives for harmonization of capital regulation, 
see SINGER, supra note 41, at 20–35. 
 345. Id. at 49. 
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Indeed, it would make the country more attractive as a jurisdiction for 
banking business.  Thus, if even one country with a major banking 
sector were to implement such an ACET1, it is quite possible that other 
countries with substantial financial industries would quickly follow suit, 
in order to avoid migration of their financial services businesses to the 
nation that provides the ACET1.346  International implementation of an 
ACET1 might therefore be brought about even without agreement on 
international standards for an ACET1.  Such standards are still desirable, 
however, to ensure a level of consistency in the models used to 
implement the ACET1 around the world.347 
In the absence of any international tax law organization or standard 
setter,348 there is little by way of an international tax forum to agree on a 
model ACET1.  International tax law is largely comprised of bilateral 
treaties, 349  whereas international financial law is populated by 
multilateral technocratic rules and standards, 350  and the BCBS in 
particular has a successful history of developing international standards 
that have been widely implemented at the national level.351  While the 
BCBS has traditionally eschewed any responsibility towards addressing 
tax issues (in Basel I, it noted that “[c]onvergence in tax regimes, though 
                                                                                                                 
 346. The imperative of regulatory competitiveness is often used to justify countries 
adopting more lax financial regulation – this is often referred to as a “race to the 
bottom.” Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it 
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 268 (2011).  Here, however, the desire for competitiveness 
would encourage larger holdings of common equity, inspiring a “race to the top.” 
 347. “The internationalization of financial markets creates the need for greater 
coordination and cooperation among financial regulators.” Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for 
Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in 
International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2011). 
 348. Some academics have proposed that an international tax law authority should 
be created, but none exists at this time. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, International Trade 
and Tax Agreements May Be Coordinated, But Not Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251, 
254 (2005). 
 349. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 
483, 497 (2004). 
 350. Brummer, supra note 346, at 260. 
 351. “[I]nternational coordination has been easier to achieve on the regulatory side 
(as with the widespread adoption of Basel standards) than in relation to taxation.” 
Michael Keen, The Taxation and Regulation of Banks 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 11/206, 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011 
/wp11206.pdf. 
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desirable, lies outside the competence of the Committee”),352 the BCBS 
is not beholden to any formal organizational documents that prohibit it 
from incorporating tax elements into its standards.353  It is therefore open 
to the BCBS to incorporate a regulatory capital-focused model ACET1 
into its standards on capital adequacy. 
Of course, while the lack of formal boundaries on the BCBS’s 
authority gives it flexibility, it also undermines the BCBS’s legitimacy 
as a standard-setting body.354  The legitimacy of the BCBS has also been 
questioned because it is an unelected and unrepresentative body,355 and 
because its standards are often implemented by national-level 
administrative law agencies without being subject to real oversight by 
democratically elected institutions.356   To date, these critiques of the 
BCBS’ legitimacy have been largely theoretical, but if the BCBS were 
to promulgate an international standard which required an ACET1 (and 
thus deprived nation states of revenue in terms of the tax that would 
otherwise be charged on Common Equity Tier 1), challenges to the 
BCBS’ authority would likely be more than just academic.  In the 
United States, Congress jealously guards its oversight over taxation 
authority, using legislation to override international tax treaties much 
more frequently than it attempts to override other types of treaties.357  In 
this context, it is unlikely that democratically elected legislatures would 
acquiesce in technocratic agencies effecting the ACET1 by way of 
administrative rule-makings. The ACET1 would have to be 
implemented by way of legislation. 
For that reason, it would be best for the BCBS to develop a model 
for an ACET1, but make that model optional.  In that way, the BCBS 
                                                                                                                 
 352. BASEL I, supra note 8, at 3. 
 353. “The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory 
authority. Its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal force.” 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS 
MEMBERSHIP (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. 
 354. Brummer notes that “some international financial organizations, like the Bank 
for International Settlements [of which the BCBS is part], have no clear responsibilities 
to any public.  The attenuated proximity to core democratic processes is problematic for 
some observers.” CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 188 (2012). 
 355. Id. at 188–89, 208.  Only twenty-seven countries are represented in the BCBS. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 7, at 1. 
 356. Many less contentious international financial standards can avoid the political 
process entirely, being implemented at the administrative level without any need for 
formal ratification. BRUMMER, supra note 354, at 188. 
 357. Avi-Yonah, supra note 349, at 493–99. 
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could strive to achieve consistency without compulsion.  As discussed 
above, the threat of international competition could provide the 
necessary compulsion for broad implementation of the ACET1: if one 
country adopts a BCBS-model ACET1, others are likely to follow suit 
so as not to lose their competitiveness as a forum for financial services 
business.358  In countries where the banking sector makes up a larger 
proportion of GDP,359  one could reasonably expect that the revenue 
implications of the proposed ACET1 would be felt more keenly than in 
a country with a less dominant financial sector, and that this may lead to 
some resistance to the implementation of such an ACET1. But these 
countries also have a greater need for financial sector competitiveness 
than do countries with more diversified economies, and more to lose in 
the event of a financial crisis.  As such, they should have more incentive 
to adopt reforms that encourage better-capitalized banks and thus 
promote financial stability. 
CONCLUSION 
Hybrid debt-equity instruments increase the complexity and 
compromise the stability of the financial system: they are “complex, 
confusing to many investors, and would not exist in a world without a 
debt/equity tax distortion.” 360   As such, hybrids are a clumsy 
reconciliation of conflicting tax policies that favor debt and regulatory 
policies that discourage debt.  In contrast, an ACET1 that allows banks 
to deduct the cost of their Common Equity Tier 1 seems to be a much 
more elegant and appealing way of resolving the tax/regulatory 
conundrum.  Not only would such an ACET1 neutralize incentives for 
                                                                                                                 
 358. See supra notes 346–47 and accompanying text. 
 359. The UK is an example of a country whose financial sector makes up a 
relatively large percentage of its GDP. See Stephen Burgess, Measuring Financial 
Sector Output and Its Contribution to UK GDP, BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL. 234 
(2011), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/ 
quarterlybulletin/qb110304.pdf.  In a recent report, the UK’s Independent Commission 
on Banking concluded that the UK had to implement financial reform over and above 
that being required by international bodies like the BCBS, because of “the position of 
the UK as an open economy with very large banks extensively engaged in global 
wholesale and investment banking alongside UK retail banking.  Indeed part of the 
challenge for reform is to reconcile the UK’s position as an international financial 
center with stable banking in the UK.” INDEPENDENT COMM. ON BANKING, supra note 
73, at 7. 
 360. Fleischer, supra note 15, at 31. 
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banks to develop hybrid debt-equity instruments, it would also 
significantly reduce incentives for banks to manipulate reporting of their 
risk-weighted assets, with the ancillary benefits of reducing regulators’ 
costs, reducing correlation risk, and reversing the migration of funds to 
the shadow banking system.  Furthermore, the ACET1 is appealing from 
a realpolitik perspective, because while banks ordinarily resist financial 
regulatory reform, they would likely embrace the implementation of an 
ACET1. 
Without the implementation of this ACET1, the BCBS and national 
authorities will perennially find themselves in the unfortunate position 
of having to evaluate new generations of hybrid instruments that have 
been designed to game regulatory capital requirements and tax laws.  
Despite the best efforts of regulators to predict how these hybrids will 
operate, many of the problems inherent in these instruments will not 
come to light until they backfire in the next financial crisis. 
